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This article examines the existing law regarding gender-related persecu-
tion and proposes a framework for evaluating the cases of women asy-
lum applicants under United States law. The introduction presents an
analysis of problems which have historically hindered the full presenta-
tion of women's claims and reviews current activities of human rights
groups, advocates and adjudicators to address the particular asylum
needs of women. Parts I and II review United States asylum law and
existing United States case law regarding gender-related persecution of
women. Part III sets out a framework for the evaluation of gender-
related cases under U.S. law, dividing cases into those involving gender-
specific persecution, in which the type of persecution is tied to the appli-
cant's gender, and gender-based persecution, in which the persecution
is inflicted because of a basis which is rooted in the applicant's gender.
Finally, part IV addresses the need for the implementation of proce-
dures in the asylum adjudication process as part of a multi-faceted
approach to improve access to asylum protection for women.
The majority of the world's refugees are female.1 Women as a
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1. Because the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
principal agency within the United Nations concerned with refugees, does not disag-
gregate refugee figures by gender, the precise number of women refugees worldwide
is not known. However, authoritative sources estimate that well over half of all refu-
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group are often the first victims of political, economic and social repres-
sion. 2 This is in part because of laws and social mores which dictate
gender-specific behavior and treatment. In addition, in societies facing
economic, social and political upheaval, women are often left alone to
care for children or elderly family members, and thus become the most
exposed to violent attack during wars or ethnic crises. Women forced to
flee their countries as refugees face continuing gender-related abuse
including sexual harassment, rape, and torture by pirates, smugglers,
border guards, camp administrators, and employers.3 Until recently,
however, the asylum claims of women refugees have largely gone unad-
gees are female. See Refugee and Displaced Women and Children, The Division for the
Advancement of Women/United Nations Office at Vienna, U.N. Doc. EGM/RDWC/
1990/WP.2 (1990) [hereinafter Refugee and Displaced Women and Children]; see also Susan
Forbes Martin, Issues in Refugee and Displaced Women and Children, Division for the
Advancement of Women/UNOV, at 1, U.N. Doc. EGM/RDWC/1990/WP.1 (1990)
(estimating that 75 percent of refugees and displaced persons are women and young
children); Juliette C. McLennan, The Resource Crisis and the Well-being of Refugee Women
and Children, at 1, U.N. Doc. EGM/RDWC/1990/CS.11 (1990) (estimating that eight
out of every ten refugees are women and children); Ann Brazeau, Gender Sensitive
Development Planning in the Refugee Context, United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees, at 2, U.N. Doc. EGM/RDWC/1990/CS.7 (1990) (stating that the "majority of
refugees are women and their dependent children, often with large proportions of
female heads of households"); UNICEF, Refugee and Displaced Children: A UNICEF Dis-
cussion Paper, submitted to an Expert Group Meeting on "Refugee and Displaced
Women and Children, organized by the Division for the Advancement of Women/
UNOV in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, in Vienna (July 2-6, 1990) (stating that children comprise 30 percent or
more of the refugee and displaced population and that women make up the second
largest category, constituting approximately eight to ten million refugees and dis-
placed persons).
In 1985, it was estimated that two-thirds of the world's refugees were women and
girls. The Activities and Programmes of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on
Behalf of Refugee Women, World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements
of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nai-
robi, Kenya, 15-26July 1985, at 5, para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 116/11 (1985).
2. Jacqueline Greatbatch, The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Dis-
course, I INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 518, 526 (1989).
3. See Anders B. Johnsson, International Protection of Women Refugees: A Summary of
Principle Problems and Issues, 1 Irr'LJ. REFUGEE L. 221 (1989) (noting the particular
vulnerability of women who are separated from their family and community to rape,
abduction, sexual harassment and obligation to grant "sexual favors" in return for
documentation and/or relief goods along escape routes and border areas, camps,
settlements and urban areas); Refugee and Displaced Women and Children, supra note 1, at
7; Martin, supra note 1, at 4-8:
Duringflight, refugee and displaced women and girls have been victimized by
pirates, border guards, army and resistance units and others with whom they
come in contact. Abduction and rape may be the consequence of seeking
asylum for those lucky enough to survive the trip. When women are sepa-
rated from husbands and brothers in the chaos of flight or they are widowed
during war, they are especially susceptible to physical abuse and rape. Piracy
attacks in Southeast Asia have been of particular concern, with increases in
severity and number in recent years, but problems of flight exist in all conti-
nents.
See also Marcia A. Gillespie, No Woman's Land: The Refugee Crisis, Ms., Nov.-Dec. 1992,




dressed under both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees 4 and United States Immigration and Nationality Act.5 The
definition of "refugee" incorporated into the Convention is gender-neu-
tral, making no distinction between male and female applicants. How-
ever, women are much less likely than men to be found to meet the
eligibility criteria for refugee status because of the absence of explicit
recognition of gender-based persecution, and because of the social and
political context in which the claims of women are adjudicated. 6 The
problem is twofold. First, the definition of "refugee" contained in the
Convention does not specifically name gender as one of the bases upon
which protection can be granted.7 Second, in applying the refugee defi-
nition, adjudicators have traditionally neglected to incorporate the gen-
der-related claims of women in the interpretation of the grounds already
enumerated in the Convention. 8
In many respects, this failure to incorporate the gender-related
claims of women refugees is a product of the general failure of refugee
and asylum law to recognize social and economic rights and its emphasis
on individual targeting and specific deprivation of civil and political
rights. 9 It is also related to a larger criticism of human rights law and
4. Opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1954).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988). The definition of "refugee" incorporated into the
Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinafter INA] is derived from the U.N. Refugee
Convention. See infra note 42.
6. See Jacqueline R. Castel, Rape, Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Persecution, 4
INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 39 (1992); Refugee and Displaced Women and Children, supra note 1, at
5-6.
7. Many advocates have called for amendment of the refugee definition to
include gender. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S TRIBUNE CENTRE ET AL., INTEGRAT-
ING WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS INTO DELIBERATIONS OF THE 1993 UNITED NATIONS
WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTO THE ON-GOING WORK OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 8 (1993) (recommending that the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights give consideration to the gender-specific needs of women refugees,
including "modification of the definition of refugee under the 1951 Convention on
the Status Relating to Refugees (sic)'and the 1967 Protocol"). The question of
whether the inclusion of gender specific claims requires an amendment to the Con-
vention's refugee definition, or whether those claims can be accommodated at least
to some extent through interpretation of the Convention's existing categories, raises
important theoretical issues as well as strategic considerations. See Riane Eisler,
Human Rights: Toward an Integrated Theoryfor Action, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 287 (1987). Stra-
tegically, it should be noted that recent restrictions in the asylum practices of western
nations in particular make the immediate expansion of Convention refugee catego-
ries unlikely. See generally DAVID A. MARTIN, THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW
IN THE 1980s (1988); David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the
Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247 (1990). See also Expedited Exclusion and
Alien Smuggling Act of 1993, S.1333, H.R. 2836 (1993); Tim Werner, Pleasfor Asylum
Inundate System for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at Al.
8. See Greatbatch, supra note 2, at 518; Johnsson, supra note 3, at 223; David L.
Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (1988); Doreen Indra, Gender: A Key Dimension of the
Refugee Experience, 6 REFUGE 3 (1987).
9. Many view the refugee definition as inherently inhospitable to claims of Third
World refugees who may flee social violence or broad-based policies that affect a
large segment of the population, rather than the loss of individual rights. See, e.g.,
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discourse-that it privileges male-dominated public activities over the
activities of women which take place largely in the private sphere: 10
The key criteria for being a refugee are drawn primarily from the realm of
public sphere activities dominated by men. With regard to private sphere
activities where women's presence is more strongly felt, there is primarily
silence-silence compounded by an unconscious calculus that assigns the
critical quality "political" to many public activities but few private ones.
Thus, state oppression of a religious minority is political, while gender
oppression at home is not.I1
As interpreted, the Convention and the United States Immigration
and Nationality Act have largely failed to recognize the political nature
of seemingly private acts of and harm to women. For example, rape is
often viewed as a private matter even when committed by a government
official or in a political context.1 2 Refusal of Iranian women to wear the
chador, though a significant form of political protest, is often character-
ized as a simple preference for style of dress.' 3
Alternatively noting that the political nature of oppression rests
upon its relation to the state, some have cautioned against overempha-
sizing the public/private distinction and have called instead for an
approach which focuses on the interconnectedness of the public and pri-
vate spheres and the relationship of women to the state:
The bifurcated version of society itself ignores the realm of women's lives
outside domesticity, and creates a rhetorical and theoretical wall between
domestic and social culture. It roots women's oppression in sexuality and
Astri Suhrke, Global Refugee Movements and Strategies of Response, in U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE POLICY: GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES 157 (Mary Kritz ed., 1983); ARIS-
TIDE R. ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (1989).
Hathaway has suggested that, given the inadequacy of the current system of pro-
tection to encompass the vast majority of involuntary migrants, refugee law should
be restructured and aligned with human rights law in a way which would afford pro-
tection to a broader class. SeeJames C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human
Rights Protection, 4J. REFUGEE STUD. 113 (1991).
10. For example, overt expression of political opinion through traditional means
such as involvement in political parties and organizations or participation in military
actions may be considered a basis for political asylum, while less traditional means of
political expression such as refusal to abide by discriminatory laws or to follow pre-
scribed rules of conduct are often categorized as personal preference. Feminists
have argued that the public/private distinction is one of the major obstacles to the
achievement of women's rights. See, e.g., Noreen Burrows, International Law and
Human Rights: The Case of Women 's Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC TO REAL-
rv 80, 86-96 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1986); Eisler, supra note 7, at 287; Charlotte
Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-vision of Human Rights, 12 HuM.
RTs. Q. (1990); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85
AM.J. INr'L L. 613 (1991).
11. Doreen Indra, A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience, 6 REFUGE 3 (1987),
quoted in Greatbatch, supra note 2.
12. See, e.g., Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 826 (1987).
13. See Greatbatch, supra note 2, at 520-21. See also M.M.G. v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, TH/9515/85 (5216) (Immigration Appeals Tribunal of
the United Kingdom) (Feb. 25, 1987).
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private life, thereby disregarding oppression experienced in non-domes-
tic circumstances, and the interconnections of the public and private
spheres. 14
Problems in the presentation of cases have also hampered the
development of doctrines and theories which incorporate the claims of
women refugees. 15 These problems arise in the development of a claim
as well as during the adjudication process in which the claim is decided.
For example, because advocates have learned to present cases within a
largely male-oriented body of law, 16 women's cases are often formulated
in ways which reflect the advocate's understanding of the law rather than
the reality of the applicant's experiences. The claims of women are
often presented as derivative of the claims of their male partners.' 7 In
14. Greatbatch, supra note 2, at 520. Greatbatch argues for a multi-faceted
approach which adopts a human rights based definition of persecution, the recogni-
tion of women as a particular social group, research into and documentation of gen-
der-specific oppression, and adoption of practices which will afford women full and
fair adjudication of their claims.
15. Of course, many claims of women which are not based on gender-specific
persecution may meet the requirements of the refugee definition even under tradi-
tional interpretations. See Greatbatch, supra note 2.
16. A review of forty-eight published decisions of the Board of Immigration
Appeals in which asylum issues were raised reveals that, in forty-one cases, the appli-
cants were male. See Matter of R, Int. Dec. 3195 (BIA 1992); Matter of H, Int. Dec.
3193 (BIA 1992); Matter ofT, Int. Dec. 3187 (BIA 1992); Matter of L, Int. Dec. 3183
(BIA 1992); Matter of RR, Int. Dec. 3182 (BIA 1992); Matter of C, Int. Dec. 3180
(BIA 1992); Matter of AA, Int. Dec. 3176 (BIA 1992); Matter of RO, Int. Dec. 3170
(BIA 1992); Matter of B, Int. Dec. 3164 (BIA 1991); Matter of K, Int. Dec. 3163 (BIA
1991); Matter of UM, Int. Dec. 3152 (BIA 1991); Matter of Villata, Int. Dec. 3126
(BIA 1990); Matter of Izatula, Int. Dec. 3127 (BIA 1990); Matter of Dass, Int. Dec.
3122 (BIA 1989); Matter of Fefe, Int. Dec. 3121 (BIA 1989); Matter of Ruiz, Int. Dec.
3116 (BIA 1989); Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989); Matter of Barrera, 19 T.
& N. Dec. 837 (BIA 1989); Matter of Rodriquez-Majano, 19 T. & N. Dec. 811 (BIA
1988); Matter of Canas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 697 (BIA 1988); Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 682 (BIA 1988); Matter ofJuarez, 19 T. & N. Dec. 664 (BIA 1988); Matter of
Rosales, 19 I. & N. Dec. 655 (BIA 1988); Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA
1988); Matter of Balibundi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 606 (BIA 1988); Matter of Vigil, 19 T. &
N. Dec. 572 (BIA 1988); Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 T. & N. Dec. 509 (BIA 1988);
Matter of AG, 19 T. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1987); Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467
(BIA 1987); Matter of Nafi, 19 T. & N. Dec. 430 (BIA 1987); Matter of Garcia-Gar-
rocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 423 (BIA 1986); Matter of Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA
1986); Matter of Linnas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 302 (BIA 1985); Matter of Sanchez and
Escobar, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276 (BIA 1985); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA
1985); Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 1985); Matter of Waldei,
19 T. & N. Dec. 189 (BIA 1984); Matter of Leon-Orosco and Rodriguez-Colas, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 136 (BIA 1983); Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1984); Matter
of Shirdel, 19 T. & N. Dec. 33 (BIA 1984); and in four cases, the principal applicant
was male, accompanied by a female derivative applicant. See Matter of DL and AM,
Int. Dec. 3162 (BIA 1991); Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989); Matter of
Tomas, 19 T. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 1987); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439
(BIA 1987). In only three cases, the principal applicant was female. See Matter of
Peugnet, Int. Dec. 3142 (BIA 1991); Matter of Soleimani, Int. Dec. 3118 (BIA 1989);
Matter of Medina, 19 I. & N. Dec. 734 (BIA 1988).
17. Refugee and Displaced Women and Children, supra note 1, at 6; Guidelines on the
Protection of Refugee Women, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refu-
gees, at 37, para. 57, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67, (1991) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines].
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such cases, the woman is rendered entirely dependent upon her partner
for her status. She risks expulsion if the application of her family mem-
ber is denied or if he unilaterally decides to renounce his claim even
though she may have a valid claim to protection in her own right. 18 She
also risks expulsion if her relationship fails.19 Additionally, the proce-
dures employed in interviewing women applicants concerning their
experiences frequently lead to inaccurate characterizations of their
claims:
Persecution of a woman will often take the form of sexual assault which
the victim may be reluctant to divulge, or which may be difficult to prove,
even if she is willing to talk about it. Few women are able to talk about
such experiences to a male interviewer and very few countries have
female staff involved in their refugee determination procedures. Even
where a woman has been persecuted (that is, subjected to such cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment as sexual assault), she thus finds it
more difficult to establish her claim than a man.
20
Often a woman must repeat her story before a male interviewer or
immigration judge with the assistance of a male interpreter.2 1 She is
subject to cross examination on the details of her experience, and any
discrepancy becomes a ground to deny her claim for lack of credibility.
22
This difficulty is exacerbated for women who, for cultural or religious
reasons, will be ostracized by their families or communities if the sexual
assault becomes known.
23
Despite the relative neglect of gender-related claims in the interpre-
tation of refugee law, there are many encouraging recent developments
legitimizing the factual basis for women's claims and the necessity for
gender-specific protocols in asylum law. Increasingly, human rights
groups and others have focused their attention on gender-specific
See also Progress Report on Implementation of the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refu-
gee Women, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programs, Sub-Com-
mittee of the Whole on International Protection, 43d Sess., at 1,7, U.N. Doc. EC/
SCP/74 (1992) [hereinafter Progress Report] (despite distribution of the UNHCR Guide-
lines to all UNHCR field offices with the instruction that they are to be fully imple-
mented, refugee wives are "still being overwhelmingly treated as dependents of their
husbands rather than as refugees in their own right. Their refugee claims therefore
tend to be overlooked or ignored by interviewers and often they are not informed of
their right to be interviewed on their own.").
18. See Progress Report, supra note 17, at 7. While similar problems would arise in a
case in which the woman is the principal applicant, far more frequently the woman's
case is subsumed into the case of her partner. Id.
19. The result of this practice is that, fearful of losing their immigration status,
many women are effectively forced to remain in abusive relationships. Id.
20. Johnsson, supra note 3, at 223; see also UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 41-
42, para. 72.
21. For example, in the United States, there is no provision, under the statute,
regulations or operating instructions that an applicant for asylum be provided with a
female interpreter or adjudicator in appropriate circumstances. See INA, supra note 5;
ASYLUM BRANCH, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ASYLUM: PROCEDURES
MANUAL AND OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS 15, 17 (1993).
22. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.16-17 (1993).
23. See Castel, supra note 6, at 55; UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 37, para. 60.
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human rights abuses24 and human rights abuses imposed on women
because of their gender. While they have directed much of this effort
toward documenting conditions experienced by women during their
flight and in the country of first asylum, 25 attention is lately being
directed toward abuses inflicted upon women in the home country.
26
24. For example, systematic individual or mass rape, forced pregnancy, abortion,
prostitution, genital surgery, beating women while pregnant, or dowry burning.
25. Studies document rape, abduction, sexual harassment, physical violence, and
coercion to provide sexual favors in return for a favorable review of women's cases,
documentation, or relief goods. Johnsson, supra note 3, at 226. See also Genevieve
Camus-Jacques, Refugee Women: The Forgotten Majority, in REFUGEES AND INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 141 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989); Martin, supra note
1, at 4-8; L. Bonnerjea, Shaming the World: The Needs of Women Refugees (CHANGE and
World University Service, June 1985).
26. See SHANA Swiss, LIBERIA: WOMEN AND CHILDREN GRAVELY MISTREATED
(1991) (documenting widespread rape and torture of Liberian women and girls as a
result of the conflict); AMNESTY INT'L, WOMEN ON THE FRONT LINE: HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS AGAINST WOMEN (1991) (detailing a pervasive pattern of human rights
violations against women by government officials which includes rape and other sex-
ual abuse inflicted as a means of torture to extract information, to discourage polit-
ical activity or as a means of punishing or discouraging the activities of family
members in a number of countries, including China, Colombia, Iraq, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Peru, the Philippines, Somalia, and the United Kingdom); AMNESTY
INT'L, RAPE AND SEXUAL ABUSE: TORTURE AND ILL TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN DETEN-
TION (1992) (second report further detailing gender-specific abuse of women in
detention as a means of suppressing political activity and social independence:
"Women who are political activists, community organizers, or human rights workers
have been targeted because they are strong. Soldiers and policemen use rape or
sexual abuse to humiliate these women and sometimes to punish them for their polit-
ical or social independence." Id. at 3. This report notes that the "the official failure
to condemn or punish rape gives it an overt political sanction, which allows rape and
other forms of torture and ill-treatment to become tools of military strategy."); LAw-
YERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AID, THE FLESH TRADE: THE TRAFFICKING OF
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN PAKISTAN (1993) (documents abduction of women and chil-
dren in Bangladesh for forced prostitution and slavery in Pakistan and prosecution of
victims by authorities in Pakistan); WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT & ASIA WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: POLICE ABUSE OF WOMEN IN PAKISTAN (1992)
[hereinafter DOUBLE JEOPARDY] (examining the gender-specific human rights abuses
suffered by women in police custody in Pakistan and the systematic failure of the
government to prosecute those who are responsible); Adrianne Aron et al., The Gen-
der-Specific Terror of El Salvador and Guatemala: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in Central
American Refugee Women, 14 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 37 (1991) (summarizing findings
regarding abuses against women in Central America obtained through treatment of
victims in the United States for post traumatic stress disorder:
Not uncommonly, women are also subjected to ordeals such as forced nudity
(sometimes including photographs), electroshock to the nipples and vagina,
squeezing or tying of the breasts, hanging by the breasts, vaginal or anal rape
with objects, mutilation of the body, and forcible witnessing any of the above,
or hearing the screams of women going through those experiences.
Id. at 39). See also OCISAM, EL SALVADOR, THE EFFECTS OF TORTURE (1985) (a study
of 142 prisoners conducted at Mariona and Illopango prisons in El Salvador); SHANA
SwIss, LIBERIA: ANGUISH IN A DIVIDED LAND (1992) (documenting torture and rape
of Liberian women by soldiers during the conflict and an increase in HIV infection
and teenage pregnancy as a result); THE FUND FOR PEACE, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
OF SUDANESE WOMEN (1992) (documenting persecution of women in the Sudan,
including humiliation, detention, and in some instances torture of female students,
professionals, wives of political prisoners, and others); AMNESTY INT'L, BOSNIA-HER-
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 26
Human Rights groups have documented widespread sexual abuse of
women in detention for numerous reasons, including as punishment for
political activity, community organizing and simple social indepen-
dence.2 7 They have also documented the systematic failure of govern-
ments to protect women from non-governmental actors such as family
members and employers.2 8 The most graphic example of gender-based
persecution being brought to international attention at this time is the
systematic rape and sexual abuse of Muslim and Groat women by Ser-
bian soldiers in Bosnia-Herzogovina. 29 Significantly, both the popular
ZEGOVINA: RAPE AND SEXUAL ABUSE BY ARMED FORCES, Doc. No. EUR 63/01/93
(1993) [hereinafter BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA] (documenting widespread rape of women
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily by Serbian armed forces but also by Muslim and
Croatian military, and detailing a number of individual cases of abuse); Situation of
Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Economic and Social Coun-
cil, Commission on Human Rights, 49th Sess., Agenda item 27, at 19-20, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1993/50, (1993) (detailing systematic rape of women and girls in Bosnia-
Herzegovina).
27. See AMNESTY INT'L, WOMEN ON THE FRONT LINE, supra note 26; AMNESTY INT'L,
RAPE, AND SEXUAL ABUSE: TORTURE AND ILL TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN DETENTION,
supra note 26; DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 26.
28. See WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT AND AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN BRAZIL (1991) (specifically
addressing domestic violence and state responsibility in Brazil, the problem of impu-
nity as reflected in the acceptance of the "honor" defense by men accused of killing
their wives, and the failure of the government to systematically prosecute crimes of
domestic violence in a non-discriminatory manner); WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT AND
MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PUNISHING THE VICTIM: RAPE AND MIS-
TREATMENT OF ASIAN MAIDS IN KUWAIT (1992) (documenting a pattern of rape, physi-
cal assault and other mistreatment of Asian maids by their Kuwaiti employers with no
effort by the government to provide them protection under the civil, criminal or
labor laws of Kuwait); WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT AND HELSINKI WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH HIDDEN VICTIMS: WOMEN IN POST-COMMUNIST POLAND, (1992)
(examining the increasing discrimination against women in post-communist Poland
with reference to their legal situation, health care, the right to association, violence
and unemployment). See also Angelica Broman, Commission for the Defense of
Human Rights in Central America (CODEHUCA), The Ongoing Struggle for Women's
Rights, Los Derechos de las Humanas, Women's Rights Section, BRECHA, Jan.-Feb. 1992
(interview with Laura Guzman, the Director of the Women's Human Rights Pro-
gramme at the Inter-American Human Rights Institute, citing the failure of tradi-
tional human rights jurisprudence to include violations occurring in the private
sphere as human rights abuses protected under international law, and calling for a
reconceptualization of gender-based violence, including domestic violence, as a vio-
lation of international human rights); Kanan Makiya, Rape in Service of the State,
NATION, May 10, 1993, at 627 (adapted from KANAN MAKIYA, CRUELTY AND SILENCE:
WAR, TYRANNY, UPRISING AND THE ARAB WORLD (1993) (documenting the manipula-
tion of "honor and shame" traditions by the government of Iraq as a means of pun-
ishment and control and the murder of young women by family members for
violating family honor)); LAWYERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AID, THE FLESH
TRADE: THE TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN PAKISTAN (1993) (docu-
menting abduction of women and children in Bangladesh for slavery in Pakistan with
no recourse to government protection).
29. Investigators have documented a widespread pattern of commanders encour-
aging and even ordering men under their command to rape women and girls as
young as seven years old. This is further explained as part of a scheme of "ethnic
cleansing" to eliminate the Muslim populations from the area through intimidation,
expulsion, murder, and the impregnation of Muslim women to give birth to Serbian
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media and human rights groups have recognized that the treatment of
women in Bosnia-Herzogovina occurs within a political context.3 0 The
rape of women there has been characterized not simply as the actions of
renegade soldiers, but as a weapon of war-a calculated move that is
part of a larger scheme of "ethnic cleansing" of Muslims and other non-
Serbs from Bosnia.
3 '
Advocates and adjudicators are also increasingly attempting to
address the particular nature of gender-related claims.3 2 In 1991, the
UNHCR issued its Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women3 3 which
recognize the particular circumstances of women refugees which may
form the basis of a persecution claim,3 4 and set out procedures to con-
duct meaningful evaluations of women's claims.3 5 The Canadian Immi-
gration and Refugee Board has also recently developed guidelines for
the evaluation of gender-related persecution claims.3 6 In addition,
courts and administrative bodies in a number of countries have granted
protection to women fleeing gender-related persecution.3 7 Although
babies. Tom Post, A Pattern of Rape: A Torrent of Wrenching First-Person Testimonies Tells
of a New Serb Atrocity: Systematic Sexual Abuse, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 32. See also
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, supra note 26 (documenting widespread rape of women in
Bosnia-Herzogovina, primarily by Serbian armed forces, but also by Muslim and Cro-
atian military, and detailing a number of individual cases of abuse); U.N. Economic
and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, supra note 26.
30. See, e.g., Jeffords, From Bosnia to the U.S., Women's Bodies Have Always Been a
Battleground, VILLAGE VOICE, July 13, 1993, at 22; Somini Sengupta, Marchers Call for
Prosecuting Bosnia Rapes as War Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at B4; Dianna Marder,
Once Again, Rape Becomes a Weapon of War, ATLANTA CoNsT., Feb. 17, 1993, at All;
Anna Quindlen, Gynocide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1993, at AI9.
31. See Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, supra note
26, at 19-20, para. 85 (finding that rape is being used in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
method of ethnic cleansing, intended to "humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the
entire ethnic group," and "designed to terrorize the population and force ethnic
groups to flee.").
32. This includes an examination of situations in which the harm to the woman is
of a type which is specifically based on her gender, as well as cases in which the
reason for the infliction of the persecution she fears is her gender.
33. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17.
34. For example, the UNHCR Guidelines recognize that a woman's claim to refugee
status may be based on severe sexual discrimination that rises to the level of persecu-
tion, id. at para. 55, victimization because of the political activities of a male relative,
id. at para. 56, or persecution for transgressing social mores, id. at para. 54. Addi-
tionally, the UNHCR Guidelines urge recognition of sexual violence against women as
a form of persecution "when it is used by or with the consent or acquiescence of
those acting in an official capacity to intimidate or punish." Id. at para. 71.
35. The UNHCR Guidelines recommend, inter alia, adoption of gender-sensitive
techniques for conducting interview of women applicants, id. at para. 72, education
of adjudicators regarding country conditions affecting women, id. at para. 73, hiring
women as interviewers and interpreters for the refugee status determination process,
and gender-sensitive training of interviewers and interpreters. Id. at para. 75.
36. See IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPER-
SON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIM-
ANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (Ottawa, Canada, Mar. 9, 1993)
[hereinafter CANADIAN GUIDELINES].
37. See, e.g., Incirciyan v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Immigration
Appeal Board Decision M87-1541, Aug. 10, 1987 (Can.); Immigration and Refugee
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the United States has no regulations or guidelines specifically address-
ing the needs of female asylum seekers and there is little published
United States case law in this area, advocates are increasingly presenting
the cases of their female clients with an emphasis on gender. A number
of cases are pending before the United States courts, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, and the Executive Office for Immigration
Review.
38
This article presents an evaluation of the current status of U.S. asy-
lum law with regard to the gender-related claims of women. It proposes
a framework, informed by developments in other countries and by the
United Nations, for assessing the cases of women seeking the protection
of political asylum and withholding of deportation. This framework rec-
ognizes asylum claims when the type of persecution is tied to the appli-
cant's gender and when the persecution is imposed for a reason related
to the applicant's gender. Under this framework, the gender-related
claims of women will largely be formulated within the particular social
group category of the refugee definition.
I. United States Political Asylum Law: General Principles
In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees39 which incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 40 Congress ulti-
mately incorporated many of the United States' obligations under the
Protocol through the Refugee Act of 1980. 4 1 Among other provisions,
Congress adopted the Protocol's definition of "refugee" without sub-
stantial alteration. 4 2 Under the Refugee Act, codified within the Immi-
Board, Decision M89-01213, June 1989 (Can.); Immigration and Refugee Board,
Decisions T89-00587, T89-00588, T89-00589,June 16, 1989 (Can.); Decision of the
Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees 439-26428-86, Nov. 24, 1988
(F.R.G.); Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Mayers, 97 D.L.R. 4th 729
(1992); Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision U92-06668,
Feb. 19, 1993 (Can.); Cheung v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 102
D.L.R.4th 214 (1993).
38. See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, No. 92-3346 (pending before the 3d Cir.) (raising, inter
alia, the issue of membership in the particular social group of Iranian feminists who
refuse to submit to Iranian law and social mores regarding women); Matter of A.R.A.,
(A# withheld) (pending before Board of Immigration Appeals) (Guatemalan woman
subjected to domestic abuse); Matter of M.T. (A# withheld) (Iranian feminist); Mat-
ter of E.B. (pending before Asylum Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice) (A# withheld) (Haitian woman threatened by abusive common law husband as
a result of political activities); Matter of M.C. (pending before the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals) (A# withheld) (Haitian woman raped by Tontons Macoutes); Matter of
T.A. (pending before Asylum Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service)
(Ethiopian feminist organizer); see also Matter of M.M. (A# withheld) (asylum granted
by I.N.S. Asylum Office in claim raising, inter alia, membership in the particular social
groups of Iranian feminists and Iranian feminist artists).
39. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
40. Openedfor signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1954).
41. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988)).
42. The only substantive difference between the refugee definition contained in
the Convention and that adopted by the United States through the Refugee Act was
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gration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has the authority to
grant political asylum to any person who meets the statutory definition
of "refugee":
43
any person who is outside of any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear
or persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
4 4
Accordingly, to establish refugee status, a woman must demonstrate
that she has been persecuted in the past or has a fear of future persecu-
tion,45 that her fear is well-founded, that the feared persecution will be
by the government or by someone whom the government is unwilling or
unable to control, 46 and that the feared persecution is on account of one
the inclusion in the Refugee Act of past persecution as a basis for determination of
refugee status. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress' major purpose in
enacting the Refugee Act was to bring United States law into conformance with its
international obligations.
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of "refu-
gee," and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ... Indeed,
the definition of "refugee" that Congress adopted... is virtually identical to
the one prescribed by Article 1(2) of the Convention...
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
43. See INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988):
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically pres-
ent in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of
such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum
in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines
that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101 (a) (42) (A) of
this title.
44. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
45. An applicant can establish eligibility for political asylum based on past perse-
cution even when she does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. See
Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989). See also INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a)(42)(A) (1988). The regulations provide that establishing past persecution
creates a rebuttable presumption that the applicant also has a well-founded fear of
future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (1993). If conditions have changed to
such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted in her country of nationality or the last habitual residence, her asylum applica-
tion can nonetheless be granted if she demonstrates compelling reasons for being
unwilling to return. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) (1993).
46. While the persecutor will ordinarily be the government, persecution by non-
governmental actors may also be found when there is a failure of state protection. See
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 104 (1991); ASYLUM BRANCH,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, BASIC LAW MANUAL: ASYLUM SUMMARY
AND OVERVIEW CONCERNING ASYLUM LAW 25 (1991) [hereinafter INS MANUAL];
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, at para. 65,
U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng. Rev. (1988) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]; McMullen
v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981); Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir.
1988); Matter of Villalta, Int. Dec. 3126 (BIA 1990).
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of five bases: race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership
in a particular social group. In a case based on political opinion, the
persecution need not be on account of the applicant's actual opinion,
but may be based on an opinion imputed to her by the persecutor.47
An applicant for political asylum is also considered an applicant for
withholding of deportation under Section 243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA).48 Section 243(h) of the INA prohibits the
Attorney General from returning an alien to a country "if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."'49
The standards of proof for establishing eligibility for asylum and
withholding of deportation differ. To establish eligibility for political
asylum, the applicant must demonstrate that she has been persecuted in
the past or that there is a reasonable possibility that she will be perse-
cuted in the future.50 To establish eligibility for the mandatory status of
withholding of deportation, an applicant must meet the higher burden
of proving that the persecution in the future is more probable than
not.
5 1
II. Gender-Related Persecution Under United States Law
Within the United States, there is little case law dealing specifically with
the gender-related persecution claims of women. For the most part, asy-
lum law has developed through the adjudication of the cases of male
applicants and has therefore involved an examination of traditionally
male-dominated activities. 52 There have been no published Board of
47. See Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,
777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985). See also GroverJ. Rees III, General Counsel, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, Legal Opinion: Continued Viability of the Doctrine of
Imputed Political Opinion (Jan. 19, 1993) (addressing the viability of the political asylum
claims based on imputed political opinion in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), and stating that "persecution inflicted
because the persecutor erroneously imputes to the victim one of the protected char-
acteristics set forth in Section 101(a)(42) can constitute persecution 'on account of'
that characteristic for the purpose of asylum or refugee analysis.").
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). While political asylum is a discretionary form of
relief, withholding of deportation is mandatory for those who meet the eligibility
requirements.
49. Id. An applicant who is granted political asylum becomes eligible to apply for
lawful permanent resident status after one year. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1988). A
grant of withholding of deportation does not carry this benefit. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1988).
50. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407
(1989).
51. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.
52. See, e.g., Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1987) (detention, interroga-
tion, and physical abuse based on suspected involvement with minority opposition
group can constitute persecution based on political opinion); Matter of Izatula, Int.
Dec. 3127 (BIA 1990) (punishment for attempting coup may constitute persecution
for political opinion when there us no legitimate means of governmental reform);
Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (coup plotting can be an expres-
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Immigration Appeals5 3 decisions and few federal court decisions which
directly address the relationship of gender to a claim of persecution
under the Refugee Act.5 4 The majority of these cases have been
brought under a political opinion or imputed political opinion theory.
The holdings of these cases vary widely, however, and provide little gui-
dance to those seeking to present gender-related claims.
In the most far-reaching U.S. case addressing gender-related perse-
cution, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a Salvadoran woman who
had been sexually abused over a prolonged period by an army officer.
5 5
The applicant in that case, Olimpia Lazo-Majano, had been subjected to
repeated rape, threats and beatings by Sergeant Zuniga, a member of
the Salvadoran armed forces for whom she performed domestic work.
5 6
When the applicant resisted the actions of Zuniga, he threatened to
denounce her to the military as a subversive. On at least one occasion,
he publicly accused her of subversive activities in the presence of a
member of the Salvadoran police. After several weeks of such treat-
ment, Ms. Lazo-Majano fled the country and sought asylum in the
United States. An Immigration Judge initially denied her claim. The
Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the decision of the Immigration
Judge, finding that the harm she feared was strictly personal and did not
constitute persecution within the Act.57 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
decision of the Board, finding that Ms. Lazo-Majano was eligible for
political asylum and for withholding of deportation based on her actual
political opinion and on the political opinion which would be imputed to
sion of political opinion); Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989)
(punishment for desertion from the guerrillas can constitute persecution on account
of political opinion in some instances); Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA
1982) (punishment for evasion of mandatory military service can constitute persecu-
tion in some instances).
53. The Board of Immigration Appeals, part of the Executive Office for Immigra-
tion Review, is an administrative tribunal created by regulation. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(a)(1) (1990). Only a small number of the BIA decisions are published. Pub-
lished decisions serve as precedent, binding on immigration judges throughout the
country except in jurisdictions where there is a federal court ruling to the contrary.
DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2d ed. 1991).
54. But see Matter of Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975) (pre-Refugee Act
decision in which the Board of Immigration Appeals denied protection under
§ 243(h) to a woman whose claim was based on fear of harm by her husband, a prom-
inent official in the Haitian government, from whom the government would not pro-
vide protection. The Board noted that the respondent did not claim that she would
be persecuted by virtue of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or mem-
bership in a particular social group and classified the harm she feared as "strictly
personal.") Id. at 461, 462.
55. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
56. Among the abuses to which Lazo-Majano had been subjected were rape at
gunpoint, having a hand grenade held to her head, threats to have her tongue cut
out, her fingernails removed and her eyes pulled out, and threats that she and her
children would be killed. Lazo-Majano's husband, who had belonged to a right-wing
paramilitary organization, had left the country several years earlier for political rea-
sons. Id. at 1433.
57. Id. at 1439.
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her, albeit cynically, by Zuniga.5 8 Significantly, the Court also found
that Sergeant Zuniga expressed an opinion regarding the nature of
power between men and women in his treatment of Ms. Lazo-Majano.
Through her flight, Ms. Lazo-Majano expressed the political opinion
that men do not have the right to dominate women. 5 9
The Ninth Circuit's expansive interpretation of the meaning of
political opinion stands in contrast to the decisions of the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits in which applicants have raised claims based on gender-specific
persecution. In 1989, the Fifth Circuit 60 upheld a denial of asylum to
Sofia Campos-Guardado, a Salvadoran woman who sought protection
based primarily on a theory of imputed political opinion6 ' after having
been raped while witnessing the brutal politically motivated murder of
family members. While Ms. Campos-Guardado was visiting her uncle
and cousins who were active in a local agricultural cooperative, the fam-
ily was attacked by two armed men and a woman. The applicant and her
female cousins were bound and forced to watch while her uncle and
male cousins were hacked with machetes and shot to death. Ms. Cam-
pos-Guardado and her female cousins were then raped by the two men
while the woman shouted political slogans. The rapist later threatened
58. The court found:
Olimpia has suffered persecution because of one specific political opinion
Zuniga attributed to her. She is, she has been told by Zuniga, a subversive
.... The opinion, it may be said, is not Olimpia's. It is only imputed to her
by Zuniga. And it is imputed by Zuniga cynically. Zuniga knows that Olimpia
is only a poor domestic and washerwoman. She does not participate in
politics.
Olimpia, however, does have a political opinion, camouflage it though she
does. She believes that the Armed Force is responsible for lawlessness, rape,
torture, and murder. Such views constitute a political opinion. And she has
been persecuted for possessing it. Because she believes that no political con-
trol exists to restrain a brutal sergeant in the Armed Force she has been sub-
jected to his brutality...
Even if she had no political opinion and was innocent of a single reflection on
the government of her country, the cynical imputation of political opinion to
her is what counts under both statutes.
Id. at 1435.
59. The court stated:
So in this case, if the situation is seen in its social context, Zuniga is asserting
the political opinion that a man has a right to dominate and he has perse-
cuted Olimpia to force her to accept this opinion without rebellion. Zuniga
told Olimpia that in his treatment of her he was seeking revenge. But
Olimpia knew of no injury she had ever done Zuniga. His statement reflects a
much more generalized animosity to the opposite sex, an assertion of a polit-
ical aspiration and the desire to suppress opposition to it. Olimpia was not
permitted by Zuniga to hold an opinion to the contrary. When by flight, she
asserted one, she became exposed to persecution for her assertion. Persecu-
tion threatened her because of her political opinion.
Id.
60. Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987).
61. The applicant also raised the claim that she was a member of a social group
comprised of her family. The Court dismissed this claim, however, with little discus-
sion. Id. at 288.
638 Vol 26
1993 Gender-Related Persecution
the applicant on numerous occasions. 62 Believing that she could find no
protection in El Salvador, she fled to the United States. She sought
political asylum, arguing that the political opinion of her family mem-
bers who were active in the agrarian land reform movement had been
imputed to her and that her rape and the threats she received were on
account of that imputed opinion. The Immigration Judge denied her
application for asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the
decision of the Immigration Judge, finding that Ms. Campos-Guardado
failed to establish that the rape was motivated by a desire to harm her
because of a political opinion that she possessed or was believed to pos-
sess,6 3 and that subsequent threats by her rapist were personal rather
than political.64 The Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the Board,
finding that the harm she suffered was motivated by a purpose different
than the harm imposed on her family members who were tortured and
murdered.
6 5
In a recent case,6 6 the Sixth Circuit denied political asylum and
withholding of deportation to a Polish woman who had been blacklisted
for her refusal to join the Communist Party and sexually abused by a
colonel who was the chief of security and internal affairs for the Polish
government.6 7 Both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals found that the actions she described did not constitute per-
secution within the meaning of the Act.6 8 The Board found that the
colonel's actions were motivated by his personal interest in the applicant
rather than "any interest on his part to 'persecute' her." 69 The court
upheld the decision of the Board, finding that the described treatment,
which the court characterized as "sexual harassment," 70 did not rise to
62. After the attack, while visiting her mother, she was introduced to a cousin,
and she was told that he had recently escaped from the guerrillas. The cousin was
her rapist. After this meeting, he followed the applicant, stole her money, and
threatened to kill her and her family if she revealed that he had raped her. Id. at 287.
63. While the Board concluded that the attack on her family resulted from her
uncle's political views, it found that Ms. Campos-Guardado had not shown that she
had been harmed in order to overcome any of her own political opinions. Id. at 288.
64. Id. Concerning Ms. Campos's fear of her assailant should she return to El
Salvador, the Board concluded that these threats of reprisal were personally moti-
vated-to prevent her from exposing his identity-and that there was "no indication
he maintained an interest in her because of her political opinion or any other
grounds specified in the Act."
65. Id. at 289.
66. Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992).
67. The facts of this case were largely undeveloped. The applicant asserted that
the colonel had "forced himself on her and used violence against her while threaten-
ing to destroy her career," and that other members of the secret police had detained
her for twenty-four hours and physically abused her. Id. at 151.
68. In addition, the immigration judge initially found that the applicant's testi-
mony lacked credibility. Both the BIA and the circuit court stated, however, that they
were disregarding the negative credibility finding. Id.
69. Id. at 152.
70. The court stated:
It is clear that the basis of petitioner's asylum claim is her fear of continued
pressure by a government official in Poland to succumb to his sexual
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the level of persecution,7 1 and that the harm was not on account of any
of the five bases enumerated in the asylum statute.
These cases reflect the lack of a cohesive framework within which to
evaluate the gender-related claims of women. Each case raised a claim
based on political opinion or imputed opinion in which the harm was
gender-specific. However, while arriving at contradictory results, 72
neither the Campos-Guardado court nor the Klawitter court attempted to
reconcile their decisions with the Lazo-Majano decision or to elaborate
principles for determining when gender-specific persecution will be con-
sidered politically-motivated. 73 The disparity in outcomes can be
explained to some extent by the particular facts and circumstances of the
individual cases. 74 Nonetheless, the cases also reflect two pervasive
problems in evaluating the asylum cases of women: difficulty accepting
advances. We agree with the Board that although petitioner's testimony
recounts an unfortunate situation, harm or threats of harm based solely on
sexual attraction do not constitute "persecution" under the Act. Even if peti-
tioner's allegations are true, they do not come within the scope of the statute.
Congress did not contemplate that a claim of sexual harassment would consti-
tute the type of persecution for which political asylum would be granted
(emphasis added).
Id. at 152.
7 1. Although the court noted that it was disregarding the original negative credi-
bility finding and assuming the facts as presented to be true, it dismissed important
assertions by the applicant because they were not fully developed. For example, the
court noted that, although the petitioner asserted that she has been questioned,
detained for twenty four hours, and physically abused by other members of the secret
police, the only testimony considered detailing these events was the applicant's state-
ment that the colonel's friends had accompanied him to her home when they were
drunk. Id. at 153. Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the colonel's abuse
of the petitioner were not clarified. While the applicant stated that the colonel had
forced himself on her and used violence against her, the record contained no elabo-
ration of the specific nature of the physical abuse she suffered. Id. at 153-54.
The court's decision also seems to have been influenced to some extent by its find-
ing that the "Ministry of Internal Affairs, which oversees the security apparatus of the
Polish government, recently underwent profound reform, including the 1990 aboli-
tion of the secret police force." Id. at 153.
72. For example, while Ms. Lazo-Majano had a personal relationship with her
persecutor extending back to childhood, the court examined the political nature of
the relationship and the political situation in which he acted against her with impu-
nity. See Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 287-89. In contrast, despite the fact that the
harm to both Ms. Campos-Guardado and Ms. Klawitter arose in an overtly political
context, neither court examined that context.
73. Nor did the Klawiter court attempt to reconcile its decision with the Ninth
Circuit's finding that physical violence imposed by a government agent against an
individual is presumed to be suspect under the Act. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777
F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985):
When a government exerts its military strength against an individual or a
group within its population and there is no reason to believe that the individ-
ual or group has engaged in any criminal activity or other conduct that
would provide a legitimate basis for governmental action, the most reason-
able presumption is that the government's actions are politically motivated.
74. For example, the Klawitter court was heavily influenced by the fact that the
applicant did not provide a detailed account of the harm to which she had been sub-
jected. See Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 153. On the other hand, the decision in Campos-
Guardado, to a .large extent, reflects a general failure to recognize imputed political
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rape and other forms of sexual abuse as violence, and the tendency to
ascribe personal motivations to persecutors when the harm is sexual.
75
In 1991, the Second Circuit for the first time addressed the issue of
a gender-based particular social group. 76 In that case, the court upheld
a denial of political asylum by the BIA to a Salvadoran woman who
sought asylum as a member of the particular social group of women who
had been previously battered or raped by Salvadoran guerrilla forces.
Ms. Gomez had been attacked by guerilla members on five occasions
while she was between the ages of twelve and fourteen. On each occa-
sion, she was either beaten or raped, her life was threatened and her
home was vandalized. She left El Salvador at the age of eighteen. In her
asylum claim, Ms. Gomez argued that, by virtue of her prior attacks, she
became a member of the particular social group of women who had
been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerrillas. The BIA
denied her case, finding that she had failed to demonstrate that the
guerrillas would seek to harm her based on her association with a partic-
ular social group or any other basis in the refugee definition. The Sec-
ond Circuit upheld the Board's decision, finding that she had failed to
offer evidence that the group for which she sought recognition pos-
sessed any common characteristics-other than gender and youth-
which would identify them as a group in the eyes of the persecutor,
77
and that there was no indication on the record that the applicant would
be singled out for further brutalization based on her membership in the
purported group. By way of analysis, the Court found only that the
traits which distinguished members of a particular social group must be
recognizable and discrete. 78 In dicta, the Court indicated that a particu-
lar social group based exclusively on gender would not stand. However,
the court did so with virtually no analysis of relevant law and left the
door open for future presentation of gender-related social group
opinion or to apply the "similarly situated" standard later incorporated into the Reg-
ulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i) (1993).
75. See generally Maureen Mulligan, Note, Obtaining Political Asylum: Classifying Rape
as a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution on Account of Political Opinion, 10 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 355 (1990); see also UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 36, para. 56.
In all three cases, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that the harm was per-
sonally motivated. See Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1434 (Board found that "such strictly
personal actions do not constitute persecution within the meaning of the Act"); Cam-
pos-Guardado, 809 F.2d at 288 (Board found that attackers were not motivated to
harm applicant because of a political opinion she possessed and that threats of repri-
sals were personally motivated); Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 152 (Board found that when
colonel threatened and harmed the applicant, he was "simply reacting to her
repeated refusals to become intimate with him"). In Klawitter, when the court deter-
mined that the colonel was sexually interested in the applicant, it dismissed the rela-
tionship as personal without further inquiry or analysis. Id.
76. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 664.
78. "Possession of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will
not by itself endow individuals with membership in a particular social group." Id. at
664. For a discussion of the relevance of the size of the particular social group, see
infra part III.B.2.a.
Cornell International Law Journal
claims. 7
9
M. Proposed Framework for the Evaluation of Gender-related Asylum
Claims
The existing refugee definition contained in the Convention and the
Immigration and Nationality Act can accommodate the majority of gen-
der-related cases of women, formulated as persecution based on mem-
bership in a particular social group, political opinion or imputed
political opinion. To do so, however, requires a reconceptualization of
the presentation of women's cases, including an examination of the
political nature of seemingly private acts and the ways in which many
states fail to accord protection to their female populations.
The majority of the cases of women eligible for political asylum can
be formulated within six categories:
1. Women who face gender-neutral forms of persecution on the same
grounds as their male counterparts;
2. Women who face gender-specific types of persecution on account of
one of the grounds enumerated in the refugee definition;
3. Women who face persecution for having transgressed the religious or
social mores of the societies from which they come;
4. Women who face severe discrimination, either by law or by custom
within their countries;
5. Women who face persecution because of their relationship to family
members whom the persecutor seeks to harm; and
6. Women who face battering or other abuse by non-governmental actors
and who are unable to obtain the protection of their governments.
Persecution within the first category, "women who face gender-neu-
tral forms of persecution on the same grounds as their male counter-
parts," is not specifically gender-related and protection can be pursued
for the most part under traditional theories of asylum law.80 This cate-
gory is not specifically discussed below.
The following section addresses each of the five remaining catego-
ries and suggests a framework for evaluating and presenting the claims
of women falling within them. The first of these, "women who face gen-
79. The court indicated that such a claim would be granted under appropriate
circumstances: "Moreover, we do not suggest that women who have been repeatedly
and systematically brutalized by particular attackers cannot assert a well-founded fear
of persecution." Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
80. Even when the applicant's gender is not central to her persecution claim,
however, there may be gender-related aspects to her case. For example, a woman
may be persecuted on account of her political opinion regarding the treatment or
status of women in her country. Similarly, a woman may face persecution based on
religion if she refuses to hold a particular religion or to conform her behavior in
accordance with the teachings of a prescribed religion. In assessing a woman's claim,
therefore, it is always important to consider the status and experiences of women in
the country from which the applicant has fled, including the position of women
before the law, the political rights of women, the social and economic rights of
women, the incidence of violence against women and the protection available to
women facing such violence. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at para. 73.
642 Vol 26
1993 Gender-Related Persecution
der-specific types of persecution," involves an evaluation of the type of
treatment considered persecutory. The remaining four categories
address situations in which the persecution is on account of a basis rooted
in the applicant's gender. Cases falling into these four categories can be
presented primarily under the particular social group basis of the refu-
gee definition. 8'
A. Gender-Specific Types of Persecution
Women throughout the world are subjected to rape and other sexual
violence82 or the threat of such violence for numerous reasons. These
reasons include punishment for race, religion, political opinion, nation-
ality and membership in a particular social group.8 3 When presented in
an asylum context, questions arise concerning both whether the sexual
violence fits within the meaning of the word "persecution" and whether
the abuse is on account of one of the enumerated bases in the refugee
definition.
There is no universally accepted definition of persecution,
8 4
although most acts of bodily violence have been recognized as such.
8 5
Rape and other severe sexual abuse has been recognized as persecution
under United States law and international interpretations of the Con-
81. In many instances they will also be compatible with an analysis under a polit-
ical opinion or imputed political opinion theory.
82. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 37 (detail the many forms of sexual
assault against women which may constitute persecution:
The methods of torture can consist of rape, the use of electrical currents
upon sexual organs; mechanical stimulation of the erogenous zones; manual
stimulation of the erogenous zones; the insertion of objects into the body-
openings (with objects made of metal or other materials to which an electrical
current is later connected); the forced witnessing of unnatural sexual rela-
tions; forced masturbation or to be masturbated by others; fellatio and oral
coitus; and finally, a general atmosphere of sexual aggression and threats of
the loss of ability to reproduce and enjoyment of sexual relations in the
future.)
See also Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 4.
83. Information recently coming to light concerning the systematic approach to
rape in Bosnia is focusing attention on the fact that rape is often used as a political
strategy. See Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, supra note
26.
84. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 51
(There is no universally accepted definition of "persecution," and various
attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success. From
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to life or
freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or mem-
bership in a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious vio-
lations of human rights-for the same reasons-would also constitute
persecution.)
While the UNHCR Handbook is not binding on the adjudicators in the United States, it
has been widely recognized as an important source of instruction regarding the obli-
gations of the United States under the United Nations 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22; see also INS MANUAL,
supra note 46, at 13.
85. See, e.g., Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Perse-
cution" includes confinement and torture).
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vention.8 6 The Board of Immigration Appeals has defined persecution
as a "threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or
harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive."8 7 It is also
widely accepted that other serious violations of human rights constitute
persecution within the meaning of the Act and the Convention.
8 8
Rape and other sexual abuse involves the infliction of both physical
and psychological suffering upon the victim. Rape has been recognized
as a "profound interference with physical integrity"8 9 and "an abuse of
power and control in which the rapist seeks to humiliate, shame,
degrade, and terrify the victim." 90 As imposed in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
it has been found to be a war crime in violation of the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1949. In addition, rape implicates many international human
rights instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, many
international standards relating to the treatment of detainees, the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, and the Draft Declaration on Violence Against Women. 9 1 In
many instances, when inflicted as a means of intimidation or coercion,
86. See Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1434 (While the Ninth Circuit did not specifically
find rape to be persecution, it listed Zuniga's rapes of the applicant among the harms
which cumulatively constituted her persecution: "Persecution is stamped on every
page of this record. Olimpia has been singled out to be bullied, beaten, injured,
raped and enslaved."). See also UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 37, paras. 58, 60;
CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 15, n. 11; Situation of Human Rights in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 26.
87. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985); see also Hernandez-
Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) (persecution is found "when there is a
difference between the persecutor's views or status and that of the victim; it is
oppression which is inflicted on groups or individuals because of a difference that the
persecutor will not tolerate."); Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986).
88. These violations need not involve physical violence. See UNHCR HANDBOOK,
supra note 46, para. 51. See also infra part III.B.2.d. for a discussion of human rights
violations as persecution.
89. See Castel, supra note 6, at 40. See also Felicite Stairs & Lori Pope, No Place Like
Home: Assaulted Migrant Women's Claims to Refugee Status and Landings on Humanitarian
and Compassionate Grounds, 6J. L. & Soc. POL'Y, 148, 153 (1990).
90. Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 26,
para. 85. The Commission also noted that, in the context of ethnic cleansing as
imposed in the former Yugoslavia, rape has been used "not only as an attack on the
individual victim, but is intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the entire
ethnic group." Id. See also Shana Swiss & Joan E. Giller, Rape as a Crime of War: A
Medical Perspective, 270 JAMA 612, 612-13 (1993).
91. See Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, supra note
26, at 74. See also UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 51; see also infra part
III.B.2.d. for a discussion of human rights violations as persecution.
An important aspect of the development of asylum protection for women is the
development of human rights instruments specific to women and the explicit inclu-
sion of women within existing human rights instruments. See Pamela Goldberg &
Nancy Kelly, International Human Rights and Violence Against Women: Recent Developments,
6 HARV. HuM. RTs.J. 195 (1993). While the United States is not a signatory to sev-
eral of the existing international human rights instruments, their use as a framework
for acceptable treatment of women is nonetheless useful. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra
note 17, at 8, para. 6.
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rape and sexual abuse of women fits squarely within the definition of
torture.
9 2
Persecution is not limited to physical abuse, however. Sexual
intimidation and threats of abuse or other lesser harms can also consti-
tute persecution within the meaning of the Convention and the Act.
9 3
For example, the UNHCR Guidelines include in their discussion of sexual
assault amounting to torture, "a general atmosphere of sexual aggres-
sion and threats of the loss of the ability to reproduce and enjoyment of
sexual relations in the future."9 4 Similarly, the UNHCR Handbook indi-
cates that threats may amount to persecution depending on the circum-
stances of each case, including the "opinions and feeling of the person
concerned." 95 In addition, the cumulative effect of numerous lesser
harms, none of which in and of itself would be considered persecutory,
can amount to persecution.96 The persecutory nature of particular
treatment should, therefore, be evaluated in light of all the circum-
stances of the case, including the applicant's subjective psychological
make-up and the effect on her of the particular harm to which she has
been subjected or which she anticipates.
In addition to establishing that the treatment she fears constitutes
persecution, the applicant must also demonstrate that the harm was or
will be imposed on account of one of the five bases enumerated in the
92. Torture is defined as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimi-
dating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimi-
nation of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, entered into force June 26, 1987, G.A. Res. 39/
46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984)
[hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Torture].
Rape has been recognized as torture by both the UNHCR, (see UNHCR Guidelines,
supra note 17, at 37, paras. 59, 60) and the Immigration and Refugee Board of Can-
ada (see CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 7, 12; see also Immigration and Refu-
gee Board (Refugee Division), Decision U92-06668 (Feb. 13, 1992) (Can.) at 8
("[C]ontinued physical, sexual and emotional abuse constitutes a violation of the
claimant's security of the person and amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment.").
93. The INS has recognized as forms of persecution from which applicants will be
protected many harms that do not involve direct physical violence. Among these are
slavery; prolonged detention without notice and opportunity to contest the grounds
for detention; arbitrary interference with a person's privacy, family, home or corre-
spondence; relegation to substandard dwellings; exclusion from institutions of
higher learning; enforced social or civil inactivity; passport denial; constant surveil-
lance; pressure to become an informer. See INS MANUAL, supra note 46, at 20-21.
94. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 37, para. 59.
95. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 52.
96. Id. para. 53.
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definition. The sexual nature of the harm often serves to personalize
the event in the eyes of the adjudicator. Because rape is frequently
viewed as a sexual act rather than an act of violence, the rapist, even
when a government official or a member of an anti-government fighting
force, is perceived as acting from personal motivation. 97 In some cases,
an applicant's failure to seek protection in her country from the rapist is
used to support a finding that the rape was not a political matter:
We live in a world where sexuality organizes culture, and sexuality is a
form of power. In a world where speaking out against a rapist can mean
death, women are left with little choice but to endure the persecution of
the rapist. This acquiescence leads the Immigration Judge to label the
incident a personal relationship. Rejecting the definition of women as a
thing to be objectified through sexual torture, is rejecting a theory of the
state that allows that power and control.
9 8
Even when the rape occurs while the applicant is in government
custody, it is often dismissed as the aberrant act of an individual which is
to be expected in times of war rather than behavior which is condoned
or encouraged by the government.
Women who are attacked by military personnel may find difficulty in
showing that they are victims of persecution rather than random violence.
Even victims of rape by military forces face difficulties in obtaining refu-
gee status when the adjudicators of their refugee claim view such attacks
as normal part of warfare.
9 9
However, information recently coming to light indicates that rape
and other sexual abuse is all too often used as a political strategy. 10 0 To
overcome the personalization of sexual abuse, education regarding the
nature of sexual abuse and its use as form of intimidation and coercion
as a general political strategy and in particular political situations must
be pursued.' 0 ' While men are often killed or tortured in other ways,
97. See Mulligan, supra note 75, at 376-80.
98. Id. at 377-78.
99. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 36-37, para. 56. In contrast, other kinds
of violence, such as torture, which arguably are also a normal part of warfare are not
rendered non-persecutory simply because they are common.
100. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 36-37, para. 56; 40, para. 71; see gener-
ally Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 26;
AMNESTY INT'L, WOMEN ON THE FRONT LINE, supra note 26; Swiss & Giller, supra note
90, at 612.
101. The collection and dissemination of information concerning the treatment of
women in individual countries is extremely important in this regard. Amnesty Inter-
national, The Women's Rights Project of Human Rights Watch, and other organiza-
tions have recently published a number of reports regarding the treatment of women
in various countries. See supra notes 26-29. However, information concerning sexual
abuse of women is not routinely collected and published in an organized way. For
example, the U.S. State Department publishes yearly reports on the human rights
situations in countries throughout the world. While the State Department devotes a
section of this report to discrimination based on race, sex, religion, language, or
social status, it does not systematically include information regarding sexual abuse of
women in these countries, or access to protection from such abuse. Additionally,
information concerning the sexual abuse of women generally is extremely difficult to
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women are often raped or tortured sexually. Proper adjudication of
these cases requires that adjudicators recognize that rape and other sex-
ual abuse are not sexual acts but acts of violence often used to coerce or
punish women because of their race, religion, nationality, particular
social group or political opinions similar to other violent acts.
10 2
B. Persecution on Account of Gender
The remaining four categories of gender-related persecution claims
address situations in which the persecution is on account of the applicant's
gender. These cases are compatible with the particular social group cat-
egory of the refugee definition. In some cases the defining characteristic
of the group will be simply "gender,"' 0 3 while in other cases it will be
gender combined with other factors. In many instances the particular
social group category will overlap with the other bases included in the
refugee definition, for example, political opinion or imputed political
opinion. This occurs when the persecutor seeks to punish the members
of the group because they possess or, by virtue of their membership in
the group, they are perceived to possess an opinion in contradiction to
the opinion of the persecutor.
10 4
1. The Particular Social Group Category Under U.S. Law
Neither the Act nor the regulations' 0 5 provide a specific definition of
the phrase "particular social group."' 0 6 Some commentators have
argued for an expansive reading of the phrase requiring only some rec-
ognizable similarity of background among group members:
The intent of the framers of the Refugee Convention was not to redress
prior persecution of social groups, but rather to save individuals from
obtain, for a number of reasons, including the failure of governments to maintain
statistics concerning gender-related crimes and widespread under-reporting of sex-
ual abuse.
102. The UNHCR recommends education of adjudicators to accept the notion that
"sexual violence against women is a form of persecution when it is used by or with
the consent or acquiescence of those acting in an official capacity to intimidate or
punish." UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 40, para. 71.
103. See infra part III.B.2.a. regarding the significance of the size of the particular
social group.
104. A gender-related claim may overlap with a claim based on nationality when a
woman loses her nationality based on marriage. A gender-related claim may overlap
with a claim based on religion when a woman fears persecution based on her refusal
to hold a particular religious belief or to conform to the requirements of a particular
religion.
105. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 1.1.
106. However, in a closely related issue, the regulations do provide guidance con-
cerning the granting of political asylum based on mistreatment of persons similarly
situated. See 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(2)(i). An applicant for political asylum has sustained
her burden of proving a well-founded fear of persecution without demonstrating she
would be singled out for persecution if she can establish: 1) a pattern or practice of
persecution of groups of persons similarly situated based on race, religion, national-
ity, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group, and 2) her own
inclusion in and identity with such group of persons such that her fear of persecution
upon return is reasonable. Id.
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future injustice. The "social group" category was meant to be a catch-all
which could include all the bases for and types of persecution which an
imaginative despot might conjure up.
10 7
This argument finds some support in the definition provided by the
UNHCR Handbook 108 which requires only "similarity of background,
habits or social status" and in the traveaux preparatoires of the
Convention:
A study of the traveaux preparatoires of the 1951 Convention, where the
term "particular social group" first was injected into the definition of 'ref-
ugee', shows that the category was meant to protect groups and individu-
als that did not fall within the categories of race, religion, and political
opinion. Social group classification was meant to have flexible bounda-
ries that would enable it to perform this function. 10 9
In Matter of Acosta, 110 the Board of Immigration Appeals offered a
somewhat more restrictive analysis of the particular social group cate-
gory of the refugee definition. Focusing on internally-defined group
characteristics, the Board interpreted the phrase "particular social
group" to mean a group of persons all of whom share a common, immu-
table characteristic. 1 I In analyzing the meaning of the phrase "particu-
lar social group," the Board examined the nature of the protection
afforded by the -other four bases enumerated in the refugee definition
107. Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basis
for Refugee Status, 15 CoLum. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 39, 41-42, 45 (1983). See also A.
GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 20 (1966) ("[I]t
seems appropriate to give the phrase a liberal interpretation. Whenever a person is
likely to suffer persecution merely because of his background, he should get the ben-
efit of the present provision.").
108. A "particular social group" normally comprises persons of similar back-
ground, habits or social status. A claim to fear of persecution under this heading may
frequently overlap with a claim to fear of persecution on other grounds, i.e. race,
religion or nationality. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 77.
The UNHCR Handbook has been recognized by the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the courts as providing gui-
dance in the application of United States Asylum Law. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
at 439 n.22; Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 220 (BIA 1985); INS MANUAL, supra
note 46, at 13, part II(C)(3).
109. ANKER, supra note 53, at 147-48. See also Neal, supra note 8, at 203, 229 ("The
drafters recognized that groups worthy of refugee status would inevitably appear
whose persecution they could not foresee. Accordingly, they inserted the social
group category and left it to posterity to flesh out its meaning."); T. David Parish,
Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity
and the Legal Concept of Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 928-29 (1992).
110. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985); see also Matter of Vigil, 19 1.
& N. Dec. 572 (BIA 1988).
111. The respondent in Acosta sought asylum based on his membership in
COTAXI, a taxi driver cooperative in El Salvador. He argued that, as a member of
the cooperative, he had a well-founded fear of the Salvadoran guerrillas who,
because of the cooperative's refusal to participate in work stoppages against the gov-
ernment, seized and burned taxis belonging to the cooperative and had killed five
cooperative members. The respondent had personally been beaten by the guerrillas
and received three threatening letters. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 216-17.
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and, applying the principle of eusdem generis,112 reasoned that the gen-
eral words "particular social group" should be read in a manner consis-
tent with the more specific words contained in the definition (i.e. race,
religion, nationality and political opinion).'1 3 Observing that each of
the four specific grounds concerned an immutable characteristic that
individuals are "unable by their own actions, or as a matter of con-
science should not be required" to change, the Board established a simi-
lar "immutable characteristic" test to guide interpretation of the




Thus, the Board in Acosta articulated two alternative criteria for the
social group category. The common characteristic defining the group
must be one that the members of the group cannot change, or it must be
one that the members should not be required to change because it is so
fundamental to the members' individual identity or conscience.' 1 5 The
Board also listed specific examples of groups identifiable by such immu-
table characteristics. Significantly, sex was among those listed. 1 6 The
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color or kin-
ship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience
such as land ownership1
7
Few Circuit Courts have addressed the question of what constitutes
a particular social group."l 8 The Ninth Circuit in Sanchez-Trujillo v.
112. "Of the same kind, class, or nature." BLACK's LAW DICTONARY 517 (6th ed.
1990).
113. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 226. The Board found that, once membership in the group is estab-
lished, to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, the applicant must estab-
lish that she possesses a belief or characteristic the persecutor seeks to overcome in
others by means of punishment of some sort; the persecutor is aware, or could easily
become aware that the applicant possesses the belief or characteristic; and that the
persecutor has both the ability and the inclination to punish the applicant. In Matter
of Mogharrabi, the Board removed the word "easily" from the second requirement of
the definition. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 446.
116. The Board rejected Acosta's claim, finding that his membership in the group
and his refusal to participate in work stoppages were not immutable-he could have
avoided the threats by either changing jobs or cooperating in the work stoppages.
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234.
117. Id. at 233. See also INS MANUAL, supra note 46, at 39. In a recent decision
setting the standard to be applied in evaluating the existence of particular social
groups, the Supreme Court of Canada relied heavily on the test articulated by the
BIA in Acosta. See Ward v. Attorney General, 103 D.L.R.4th 1 (1993). The test
adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court incorporated the requirement that a partic-
ular social group be defined by an immutable characteristic. Under Ward, particular
social groups include: (1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteris-
tic; (2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to
their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and (3)
groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical per-
manence. Id.
118. In many cases where the issue has been raised, the courts have based their
decisions on other factors, declining to resolve the social group issue. See Parish,
supra note 109, (citing Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1992) (family); Gatch-
alian v. INS, No 90-70204, 1991 U.S. App. (9th Cir. May 31, 1991) (Philippine land-
owners); Alvarez-Florez v. INS, 909 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1990) (former campesino
649
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INS 119 carved out four criteria for the determination of the existence of
a particular social group within the refugee definition: 1) a close affilia-
tion between members of the group, 2) a common impulse or interest
upon which the affiliation is based, 3) a voluntary association, and 4) the
existence of a common trait-by which group members are distinguish-
able from the general population.'
20
Under the standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit, a particular
social group defined solely by gender would have little chance of success
because of the "voluntariness" requirement.12' The Ninth Circuit stan-
cheesemakers from El Salvador); Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998 (9th Cir.
1988) (poor urban workers in El Salvador); Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285
(5th Cir. 1987) (family); Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1986) (Miskito
Indians in Nicaragua); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 599 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Ga.
1984), rev'd sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1022 (1986) (Cubans who left Cuba during the Mari6l boatlift)).
119. 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). In that case, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding of deportation to applicants who sought
protection as part of a social group comprised of young, Salvadoran, urban, working
class males of military age who had maintained political neutrality.
120. Under the Sanchez-Trujillo standard, once a cognizable social group has been
established, three additional criteria must be evaluated to determine whether the
applicant will qualify for relief within the social group category: 1) whether the appli-
cant has demonstrated that she is a member of the group; 2) whether she has demon-
strated that the group has, in fact, been targeted for persecution; and 3) if the
applicant is seeking protection based on mere membership in the particular social
group, whether special circumstances exist to warrant a finding of per se eligibility on
the basis. See id. at 1574-75.
The "special circumstances" requirement articulated by the Ninth Circuit is
derived from the UNHCR Handbook, which provides: "Mere membership of a partic-
ular social group will not normally be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee sta-
tus. There may, however, be special circumstances where mere membership can be a
sufficient ground to fear persecution." UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 79.
The UNHCR Handbook contains a similar requirement for claims arising under the
categories of race ("particular circumstances"), id. para. 70; and religion ("special
circumstances"), id. para. 73. The special circumstances requirement has not been
explained. Some advocates have argued that it applies when a particular social group
claim is not coupled with a claim under another basis in the refugee definition. See C.
P. Blum, Refugee Status Based on Membership in a Particular Social Group: A North American
Perspective, in ASYLUM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A COMPAR-
ATIVE ANALYSIS 81, 87 (J. Coil &J. Bhabbha eds., 1992). The plain language of the
provision, however, supports an interpretation that the special circumstances provi-
sion applies when the applicant offers only her membership in the particular social
group as substantiation that her fear is well-founded. See id. at 88 n.39. For example,
ordinarily an applicant will offer facts, such as past persecution or threats, based on
her membership, to demonstrate that her fear is well-founded. There may, however,
be special circumstances, such as a change in government or policy toward the partic-
ular social group, which would support a finding that the applicant's fear is well-
founded even though she previously lived in her country without incident. An exam-
ple of such a situation would be the case of an Iranian feminist who refuses to wear
the chador and who left Iran prior to the fundamentalist revolution. Although she
may not have experienced problems in her country prior to her departure, her fear of
persecution upon return as a member of the particular social group of women who
violate societal or religious norms will be well-founded.
121. But see In re: Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (Imm. Court July 26, 1993) (Immi-
gration judge decision in the Ninth Circuit granting asylum to a gay Brazilian male as
a member of the particular social group of homosexuals). The court acknowledged
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dard has been widely criticized, however, for being overly restrictive and
for drawing arbitrary distinctions which have no basis in either the Con-
vention or U.S. law. 122 For example, the Court offered no explanation
for the requirement that the association be voluntary, which appears to
contradict the BIA's requirement that members of a social group pos-
sess an immutable characteristic. In addition, despite its reliance on a
voluntary association, the Ninth Circuit offered "the immediate mem-
bers of a certain family, the family being a focus of fundamental affilia-
tional concerns and common interests for most people as the
prototypical example of a particular social group."' 23 The voluntari-
ness requirement has also been criticized as arbitrary because it provides
protection from persecution resulting from a choice made by the indi-
vidual, but inexplicably does not provide protection for persecution
resulting from a characteristic over which the individual has no control.
No other court has applied this requirement.1 24 In some cases the right
to relief because of involuntary group membership has been
recognized. 125
Other courts have emphasized the perspective of the persecutor in
defining a particular social group. For example, in a case involving a
Ghanaian woman who faced persecution because of her membership in
the Ashanti tribe and a family of highly educated professionals associ-
ated with the former government of Ghana, the First Circuit1
2 6
examined the government's view of the groups to which the applicant
belonged. Referring to the UNHCR Handbook for guidance, the Court
noted that the threat of persecution arose because of characteristics
the "voluntariness" requirement articulated by the Ninth Circuit. In analyzing the
facts, however, the court focused on the immutable nature of sexual orientation. Id.
at 14. Application of the "voluntariness" requirement would not however preclude a
finding of a particular social group consisting of a subset of women sharing a volun-
tary association.
122. See Anker, supra note 53, at 147; D. Compton, Asylum for Persecuted Social
Groups: A Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar, 62 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1987); Parish, supra note
109, at 941; see generally M. Graves, From Definition to Exploration: Social Groups and
Political Asylum Eligibility, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 740, 771 (1989); Blum, supra note 120,
at 88.
123. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. But see Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d
916, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the extended family was not a cognizable social
group).
124. But see Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Sanchez-Trujillo in
dicta, a case where the court did not consider the petitioner's argument that he was a
member of the particular social group of Tamil males between 15 and 45 because the
petitioner had not raised the issue below and therefore failed to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies).
125. See, e.g., Aneneh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621,626 (Ist Cir. 1985) (classes
of society, family, tribe); Matter of Toboso, No. A23 220 664 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990)
(unpublished decision) (sexual preference); In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (Imm.
Court July 26, 1993) (sexual preference).
126. See Ananeh-Firempong, 766 F.2d at 623. The court, however, provided very lit-
tle analysis of the term "particular social group." While granting the applicant's
motion to reopen on a finding that she had established primafacie eligibility for with-
holding of deportation, the court failed even to indicate which of the particular social
group categories raised was the basis of its decision.
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which the applicant was unable to change, and that the group might face
persecution because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the
government or because the political outlook, antecedents, or economic
activities of its members, or the very existence of the social group as
such, is viewed as an obstacle to the Government's policies.
127
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Gomez v. INS,' 28 emphasized the
view of the potential persecutor in determining the existence of a partic-
ular social group. The Court found that members of a group must pos-
sess "some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to
distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of the
outside world in general." 
1 29
The cases and commentary reflect two competing interests: 1) that
the particular social group category be given a liberal reading which is
broad enough to offer protection to groups whose social origins put
them at risk and flexible enough to evolve in response to changing cir-
cumstances; 130 and 2) that the definition not be so broad as to encom-
pass all persons who may be facing harm as a result of war or
generalized violence, or persons who can escape persecution by reason-
ably acceptable alterations of their behavior.'
3 '
A useful test for assessing the existence of a particular social group
which acknowledges these competing interests is one which combines
127. Id. at 626; UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 78, provides:
Membership of such a particular social group may be at the root of persecu-
tion because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the Government
or because the political outlook, antecedents or economic activity of its mem-
bers, or the very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obsta-
cle to the Government's policies.
See also Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 30 (1984).
128. 947 F.2d 660 (2nd Cir. 1991).
129. Id. at 664. The court reiterated the "close affiliation" test from Sanchez-Tru-
jillo and found that the appellant had not demonstrated that members of the group
possessed any characteristics which would identify them in the eyes of the persecutor.
Blum has criticized the Court's approach in this case as "fundamentally miscon-
ceived," arguing that, as in Sanchez-Trujillo, "while the court acknowledges that the
perceptions of the persecutor help shape the social group, it fails to apply that crite-
ria to the case before it. Thus, the court fails to grasp that it is the applicant's prior
brutal victimization that places her in a situation of continuing vulnerability, based
not just on her gender and age but also on her experience as a victim." Blum, supra
note 120, at 90-91.
130. Hathaway suggests that the Board's interpretation of the meaning of social
group in Acosta is appropriate in that it respects:
both the specific situation known to the drafters-concern for the plight of
persons whose social origins put them at comparable risk to those in the
other enumerated categories-and the more general commitment of ground-
ing refugee claims in civil or political status. More importantly, the standard
is sufficiently open-ended to allow for evolution in much the same way as has
occurred with the four other grounds, but not so vague as to admit persons
without a serious basis for a claim to international protection.
HATHAWAY, supra note 46, at 161.
131. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234 (finding that the respondent could avoid




the immutable characteristics requirement with the requirement that the
group be identifiable by the persecutor. Under this analysis, members
of a particular social group are defined by a characteristic: 1) which they
cannot change or which is so fundamental to their identity that they
should not be required to change; and 2) which marks them as members
of the group in the eyes of the persecutor.' 3 2 The group must be
socially meaningful-that is, it must be viewed as a group by the govern-
ment or by other sectors of society. The members of the group should
be seen by the persecutor as "other,"'13 3 and it is this "otherness" which
is at the root of the persecution.'
3 4
This test allows for the inclusion of a broad category of applicants
whose social origins place them at risk:
This formulation includes within the notion of social group: 1) groups
defined by an innate, unalterable characteristic; 2) groups defined by their
past temporary or voluntary status, since their history or experience is not
within their current power to change; and 3) existing groups defined by
volition, so long as the purpose of the association is so fundamental to
their human dignity that they ought not be required to abandon it.13
5
At the same time, it limits the group by linking membership in the
group to the persecutor's ability to target individuals as members of the
group, thus distinguishing particular social group members from mem-
bers of the general population, statistical groupings or displaced
persons.'
3 6
2. Women as a Particular Social Group
In some instances, when presenting gender-related persecution claims
under a particular social group theory, the immutable characteristic of
132. The view that an essential criterion for social group eligibility is the percep-
tion of the group by the persecutor is widely accepted by commentators:
[A]ttention should be given to the presence of uniting factors such as ...
shared values, outlook and aspirations. Also relevant are the attitude to the
putative social group of other groups in the same society, and in particular
the treatment accorded to it by state authorities. The importance, and there-
fore the identity, of a social group may well be in direct proportion to the
notice taken of it by others, particularly the authorities of the state.
GoODWIN-GILL, supra note 127, at 30; see also Blum, supra note 120.
133. See Parish, supra note 109, at 946.
134. This analysis will often overlap with political persecution on account of polit-
ical opinion or imputed political opinion. The social group will often be marked for
persecution because of a particular political opinion which members of the group
share or which the persecutor believes that they share. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra
note 46, para. 78.
135. HATHAWAY, supra note 46, at 161, addressing the immutable characteristics
requirement set forth by the BIA in Acosta. See also Ward v. Attorney General, 103
D.L.R.4th 1 (1993).
136. See Parish, supra note 109. Parish distinguishes refugees from displaced per-
sons, noting that the "factual breach of the bond between a refugee and his country
of origin" is the distinctive element which identifies a refugee. Id. at 990, (quoting A.
GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 107).
Parish notes that persecution within a social group context occurs only when the state
denies protection to particular citizens due to their common social identity.
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the particular social group will simply be the applicant's gender.13 7 The
definition of a particular social group on this basis is consistent with the
Convention refugee definition.13 8 The use of gender alone as the defin-
ing characteristic of the group raises at least two important considera-
tions: 1) the significance of the size of the group to the group definition,
and 2) the appropriateness of incorporating the persecution feared into
the definition of the group.
a. Size of the Particular Social Group
While some courts have declined to accept certain particular social
groups because they have found them to be too broad,' 3 9 there is no
support under the Convention for an argument that size alone should be
the determinative factor: "[O]nce a person is subjected to a measure of
such gravity that we consider it 'persecution,' that person is 'persecuted'
in the sense of the Convention, irrespective of how many others are sub-
jected to the same or similar measures."
1 40
When a group of persons is identified for persecution on account of
one of the grounds covered in the refugee definition, the size of the pool
of people potentially eligible for protection should not limit the exten-
sion of that protection.' 4 1 To the contrary, the fact that a large number
of people in an applicant's situation fear harm at the hands of the gov-
ernment or other persecutor often lends credibility to the asylum
137. Because asylum concerns the ability of the applicant to obtain protection in
her country, the definition of the group will also necessarily include the applicant's
citizenship or nationality (i.e. Zimbabwean women).
138. The UNHCR has recognized, in the context of severe discrimination, that
gender alone can define a particular social group. See UNHCR Executive Committee,
Note on Refugee Women and International Protection, at 5, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/59 (1990);
see also UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 40, para. 71.
139. See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577:
[S]uch an all-encompassing group as the petitioners identify simply is not the
type of cohesive, homogenous group to which we believe the term" particular
social group" was intended to apply. Major segments of the population of an
embattled nation even though undoubtedly at some risk from general polit-
ical violence, will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct "social group" for the
purpose of establishing refugee status. To hold otherwise would be tanta-
mount to extending refugee status to every alien displaced by general condi-
tions of unrest or violence in his or her home country.
See also Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d
1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
140. 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (1966), quoted
in Stairs & Pope, supra note 89, at 171.
141. See CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 6 ("The fact that the particular
social group consists of large numbers of the female population in the country con-
cerned is irrelevant-race, religion, nationality and political opinion are also charac-
teristics that are shared by large numbers of people."); see also Sanchez-Tnruillo, 801
F.2d at 1577 ("Few could doubt, for example, that any Jew fleeing Nazi Germany in
the 1930's or 1940's would by virtue of his or her religious status alone have estab-
lished a clear probability of persecution.") (quoting Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777




In contrast, a statistical grouping will not constitute a particular
social group 143 within the meaning of the Convention or the Act.' 44
For example, in a situation of random violence, the fact that a greater
percentage of victims coincidentally share a particular characteristic
does not indicate that they are a socially meaningful group and have
been targeted for persecution on a proscribed ground. However, if a
group is recognized by a persecutor and threatened or persecuted based
on an immutable group characteristic, it makes no difference whether
the targeted group comprises a very large segment of the population of
the country.' 4 5 It is only relevant that the group, as defined, comports
with the requirements of a particular social group. Applying the analysis
proposed above, the particular social group must have a social identity
within the specific cultural context based on an immutable and identifi-
able characteristic, and the group members must be targeted for perse-
cution based on group membership.
1 4 6
When women are singled out within a particular society as a group
and subjected to persecutory treatment, or denied protection from such
treatment merely on the basis of their gender, the group of "women"
constitutes a particular social group within the refugee definition.
Women constitute a social group both because they share certain 'immu-
table' characteristics and because they are frequently treated differently
from men. To a greater extent than most social groups, women are an
easily identifiable 'group'. . . Women share immutable characteristics.
They are an easily identifiable group, possessing a combination of biolog-
ical and socially attributed characteristics.'
4 7
142. See 8 CFR § 208.13(b)(2)(i) (providing that an applicant can meet her burden
of proof in establishing eligibility for political asylum by demonstrating persecution
of similarly situated persons).
143. The inclusion of the word "particular" within the phrase "particular social
group" has been raised as an indication of an intent to limit the scope of protected
groups. See Shanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576; see also M.E.I. v. Marcel Mayers, 97
D.L.R.4th 729, 736 (1992). Parish correctly points out that "the word 'particular' is,
however, necessitated by the grammatical construction of the sentence in which it
falls; to omit it would have the Refugee Act literally protecting only those persecuted
for their membership in the class of people consisting of all those who are members
of any social group." Parish, supra note 109, at 925.
144. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576 ("[Al statistical group of males taller
than six feet would not constitute a "particular social group" under any reasonable
construction of the statutory term, even if individuals with such characteristics could
be shown to be at greater risk of persecution than the general population.").
145. See, e.g., INS MANUAL, supra note 46, at 36 (offering "Apartheid in South
Africa" as an example of a situation in which the mere fact of membership in a certain
racial group will be sufficient to substantiate a claim to refugee/asylee status based
on racial discrimination amounting to persecution.) See also UNHCR HANDBOOK,
supra note 46, para. 76 (noting that in some cases of persecution based on nationality,
persons belonging to a majority group may fear persecution by a dominant minority).
146. See generally Parish, supra note 109, at 937.
147. Stairs & Pope, supra note 89, at 167.
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Because asylum is an individual remedy, despite membership in the
particular social group, the individual applicant will nonetheless be
required to establish her eligibility under the refugee definition.148 The
size of the group ultimately eligible for protection will necessarily be
limited by other factors. For example, even though an applicant can
establish that she is a member of the particular social group, possessing
the defining characteristic of the group, she will still be required to
demonstrate that she meets the other elements of the refugee definition.
She must demonstrate that she has been persecuted in the past' 49 or
that she fears future persecution, that her fear of future persecution is
well-founded, and that the feared persecution is by the government or
by someone whom the government is unable or unwilling to control. 150
Thus, while the initial particular social group could be large, the group
which is ultimately eligible for asylum protection will be much smaller.
b. Incorporation of Feared Persecution into the Definition of the
Group
An issue related to the potential size of the particular social group is the
question of whether it is appropriate to define the group by the persecu-
tion feared.' 5 ' In recent cases, both the Federal Court of Canada and
the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board have articulated particu-
lar social groups to include the persecution the claimant is seeking to
avoid.152 In granting relief to a woman from China fleeing forced steril-
148. See CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 6:
[R]efugee status being an individual remedy, whether or not it is based on
social group membership, the woman will need to show that she has a genu-
ine fear of harm, that her gender is the reason for the feared harm, that the
harm is sufficiently serious to amount to persecution, that there is a reason-
able possibility for the feared persecution to occur if she is to return to her
country of origin and she has no reasonable expectation of adequate national
protection.
149. The regulations set out a particular test to be applied when an applicant seeks
asylum based on past persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208(13)(b)(1).
150. In a rare circumstance where the applicant seeks asylum based on mere mem-
bership in a particular social group, she will be required to demonstrate special cir-
cumstances which establish that her fear of persecution is well-founded. See supra
note 106.
151. See M.E.I. v. Mayers, 97 D.L.R. 4th 729, 739 (1992) (in evaluating whether the
credible basis panel appropriately found that "Trinidadian women subject to wife
abuse" could constitute a particular social group, the court stated,
A question may be posed for the future: since, in this context, persecution
must be feared by reason of membership in a particular social group, can fear
of that persecution be the sole distinguishing factor that results in which is at
most merely a social group becoming a particular social group?).
152. See Cheung v. M.E.I., 102 D.L.R.4th 214 (1993); see also Immigration and Ref-
ugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision U92-06668, Feb. 19, 1993 (Can.) (finding
that "unprotected Zimbabwean women or girls subject to wife abuse" and
"Zimbabwean women or girls forced to marry according to customary laws of
'Kuzvavura' and 'Lobola' " constitute particular social groups within the Convention
refugee definition.); Immigration and Refugee Board, Decision U92-08714, June 4,




ization on the basis of her membership in a particular social group, the
Federal Court of Canada found that "women in China who have more
than one child and who are faced with forced sterilization" are identified
by a purpose which is "so fundamental to their human dignity that they
should not be required to alter it.' l5 By incorporating the feared harm
into the definition of the group, the court limited the size of the particu-
lar social group, thus alleviating concerns that a group identified solely
by gender was too broad.
15 4
It is unlikely, however, that the Board of Immigration Appeals or
U.S. courts will formulate a standard for evaluating gender-related par-
ticular social groups which incorporates the persecution into the defini-
tion of the group. The Supreme Court's holding in INS v. Zacarias 1
5 5
and subsequent decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals have
placed great emphasis on the "on account of" language of the refugee
definition. 156 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit's holding in Gomez v. INS 
15 7
stressed the importance of defining the group by characteristics which
mark that group for persecution in the eyes of the persecutor. To iden-
tify a group by the ultimate harm the group seeks to avoid runs counter
to these decisions.
An analysis which is consistent with United States case law is one
which distinguishes between the particular social group and the refugee
group.15 8 While the refugee group must be defined in terms of the per-
secution, the particular social group should be viewed in other terms.
153. Cheung v. M.E.I., 102 D.L.R.4th 214 (1993).
154. See M.E.I. v. Mayers, 97 D.L.R.4th 729 (1992). The court in Cheung did not
offer a rationale for the incorporation of the feared harm into the definition of the
group. One analysis is that, in many cases, the vulnerability of the woman and the
failure of the state to protect is directly tied to the type of harm. For example, a
woman may be protected from violence generally but may be denied protection from
spousal abuse. See Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace but Home: Asylum in the United States for
Women Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 565 (1993).
155. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (finding, in a case involving a
Guatemalan applicant who feared persecution by the guerrillas as a result of his
refusal of conscription, that the applicant must establish that the harm he feared was
on account of his political opinion rather than the persecutors' political opinion or
their desire to increase their membership.)
156. See Matter of R.O., Int. Dec. 3170 (BIA 1992) (finding that victim of forced
recruitment by Salvadoran guerrillas had not established that threats made against
him were "on account of" his political opinion and not the result of the guerrillas'
aim to increase their military ranks); see also Matter of R, Int. Dec. 3195 (BIA 1992)
(finding that brutal treatment of a Sikh by Indian police in the course of an investiga-
tion did not establish eligibility for asylum where the purpose of the mistreatment
was to obtain information about militants rather than to punish him because of his
political opinions).
157. 947 F.2d at 664.
158. To some degree the court in Chueng merged the two groups. The court
stated:
I find, therefore, that women in China who have more than one child, and are
faced with forced sterilization because of this, form a particular social group
so as to some within the meaning of a Convention refugee. This does not
mean, of course, that all women in China who have more than one child may
automatically claim Convention refugee status. It is only those women who
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The definitive characteristics of a particular social group are those which
mark the group for persecution and not the actual persecution itself.
While the persecution suffered by an applicant in the past is relevant to
the whether her fear of future persecution is well-founded and may, in
some instances, make her identifiable to the persecutor as a member of
the group, the characteristic which defines the group is generally sepa-
rate and distinct from the persecution. For example, in the case of a
woman who is subject to battering by her spouse and to whom the gov-
ernment has denied protection, it is not the fact that she has been bat-
tered in the past which marks her for future battering or upon which
basis the state has denied its protection. The fact that she has been bat-
tered in the past is evidence that her fear of future battering is well-
founded. However, the characteristic which identifies her for battering
is her gender-not her past battering.15 9
Under the particular social group analysis proposed above, 160 the
particular social group is defined by: 1) group characteristics which
members cannot change or which are so fundamental to their identity
that they should not be required to change, and 2) group characteristics
mark them as a group in the eyes of the persecutor. The refugee group
is a smaller one comprised of that collection of women from the particu-
lar social group who also meet the other criteria of the refugee
definition.
Applying this analysis, the remaining four categories of gender-
related cases are compatible with a particular social group theory. 16 1
c. Women Who Face Persecution for Having Transgressed the
Religious or Social Mores of Their Societies
The use of the particular social group basis of the refugee definition to
extend protection to women who face persecution for having trans-
gressed religious or social mores of their societies finds strong support
in pronouncements of the UNHCR and governmental bodies and the
administrative decisions of several countries. 162 In 1984, the European
also have a well-founded fear of persecution as a result of that who can claim
such status.
Cheung v. M.E.I., 102 D.L.R.4th 214.
Similarly, while identifying the particular social groups as "women in China who
have more than one child and who are faced with forced sterilization," the Immigra-
tion and Refugee Board named "gender" as the "innate and unalterable characteris-
tic which defined the group." Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division),
Dec. U92-06668, at 16.
159. See Stairs & Pope, supra note 89, at 171 ("Because battering is not the only
form of persecution women experience, it makes sense to define the group as
'women' and consider the battering under the category of persecution, that being the
form persecution takes in these cases."). But see Goldberg, supra note 154.
160. See supra part III.B.1.
161. These categories are intended to represent the refugee group rather than the
particular social group.
162. Several cases in which gender-related issues have been raised are presently
pending before the courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the INS Asylum
Office. See supra note 38. A case was recently granted by the INS Asylum Office in
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Parliament adopted a resolution calling upon states to accord refugee
status within the particular social group category of the refugee defini-
tion to women who suffer cruel and inhuman treatment because they
have violated the moral or ethical rules of their society.' 63 In 1985, the
Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees 164 considered a similar resolution, ultimately adopting a con-
clusion which recognized "that states, in the exercise of their sover-
eignty, are free to adopt the interpretation that women asylum-seekers
who face harsh and inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed
the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a
'particular social group' within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the
United Nations Refugee Convention."'
6 5
Throughout the late 1980's, the UNHCR, in an increasing aware-
ness of the particular circumstances of refugee women, adopted a series
of Executive Committee Conclusions aimed at affording more meaning-
ful protection to women fleeing persecution in their home countries.
1 66
which an Iranian woman based her claim in large part on her membership in the
social groups of Iranian feminists and Iranian feminist artists. However, because the
agency does not provide reasoned decisions when granting applications, the basis of
the grant was not explained. See Matter of M.M. (A# withheld).
163. Johnsson, supra note 3, at 224. A similar resolution was adopted by the Soes-
terburg Conference on Refugee Women in 1985. Id.
164. The function of the Executive Committee, established in 1957, is to advise the
High Commissioner "in the exercise of the statutory functions; and advising on the
appropriateness of providing international assistance through UNHCR in order to
solve such specific refugee problems as may arise." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 127,
at 7.
165. Report of the Thirty-Sixth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's
Programme, Geneva, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/673 (1985), para. 115(4)(k) [hereinafter
Thirty-Sixth Session]. The conclusion adopted was a compromise from that initially
proposed, which would have been identical to the European Parliament Resolution.
The compromise was reached as a result of fears that a stronger conclusion would
have been viewed as a criticism of certain religious beliefs or cultural practices. See
Johnsson, supra note 3, at 221.
166. See, e.g., Thirty-Sixth Session, supra note 165 (noting the need to give particular
attention to the international protection of refugee women); General Conclusions on
International Protection, Report of the Thirty-Eighth Session of the Executive Committee of the
High Commissioner's Programme, Geneva, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/702 (1987) (calling on all
states and concerned agencies to support the efforts of the Office of the UNHCR to
recognize the need for improvement of the protection and assistance programs with
regard to women refugees); Refugee Women, Report of the Thirty-Ninth Session of the Execu-
tive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Geneva, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/721
(1988) (noting, among other things, the need for public information on the issue of
refugee women and the need for the development of training modules on the sub-
ject, in order to increase awareness of the specific needs of refugee women and the
practical means of addressing their needs).
The attention to the problems facing refugee women was prompted in part by the
World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Develop-
ment and Peace, held at Copenhagen in 1980, which adopted three resolutions
devoted to action by the UNHCR concerning refugee women. See Refugee and Displaced
Women and Children, supra note 1, at 2, para. 2. The Forward-Looking Strategies for the
Advancement of Women, U.N. GAOR 40/108, which grew out of the 1985 World Con-
ference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for
Women, also highlighted the situation of refugee and displaced women. Id.
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InJuly, 1991, the UNHCR adopted its Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee
Women,' 6 7 which note that women in a number of countries who face
violence as severe as death for violating social mores should be ensured
legal protection. 16 8 The UNHCR Guidelines encourage states to address
their claims under the particular social group category.
16 9
The Canadian government has applied the UNHCR's interpretation
of the Convention in extending protection to women fleeing gender-
related persecution.17 0 In 1987, the Immigration Appeals Board of
Canada granted asylum to a woman seeking to avoid deportation to Tur-
key. 171 Although the claimant based her application on her religion and
nationality, 172 the Board expanded her claim to include membership in
the particular social group of "single women living in a Moslem country
without the protection of a male relative."'173 A widow and mother, Ms.
Incirciyan was subject to harassment on a daily basis by young Moslem
men. When she sought the protection of the police, she was refused.
Her daughter was also sexually assaulted. The Board granted refugee
status to the claimant and her daughter, recounting their mistreatment
and finding that ". . . the (Turkish) State does not wish to protect the
167. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 36, para. 54.
168. This violence is not only at the hands of government authorities, but also
from private actors from whom the government fails to provide protection. Id. at 40-
41, para. 71.
169. Id. at 36, para. 54. The Guidelines, however, also note that it is left to the
discretion of individual states whether to follow the recommendation of the UNHCR
Executive Committee.:
The claim to refugee status by women fearing harsh or inhumane treatment
because of having transgressed their society's laws or customs regarding the
role of women presents difficulties under this definition. As a UNHCR legal
adviser has noted, "transgressing social mores is not reflected in the univer-
sal refugee definition." Yet, examples can be found of violence against
women who are accused of violating social mores in a number of countries.
The offense can range from adultery to wearing of lipstick. The penalty can
be death, the Executive Committee of the UNHCR has encouraged States to
consider women so persecuted as a "social group" to ensure their coverage,
but it is left to the discretion of countries to follow this recommendation.
Id.
170. It is appropriate for United States courts to consider such foreign interpreta-
tions in evaluating the application of treaties within the United States. See ARTHUR
HELTON, The Use of Comparative Law and Practice under the International Refugee Treaties, in
ASYLUM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 9, 11 (1992); see also Air
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1991) (In examining the terms of the Warsaw
Convention, the Court stated that, because "treaties are construed more liberally
than private agreements," it is necessary to "look beyond the written words to... the
practical construction adopted by the parties," in order to "ascertain" the meaning
of the treaty.); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-432
(1934); Reed v. Wise, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977)
(In interpreting the Warsaw Convention, the Court considered foreign case law, not-
ing that the Convention "must be read in the context of the national legal systems of
all its members.").
171. Incirciyan v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Immigration Appeal
Board Decision M87-1541X, Aug. 10, 1987 (Can.).




applicant and her daughter, two Armenian women who were Christians
and who lived alone in a Moslem country where, according to Islamic
tradition, they should have had the protection of a male relative."
1 74
The Board offered no instruction on the standard to be applied in evalu-
ating a social group claim. However, certain principles are evident in its
characterization of the case. First, the claimant belonged to a social
group comprised of women who had violated the social mores of their
society-by living alone when they were expected to have the protection
of a male relative. Second, since the persecution she feared did not
directly emanate from the government, it was necessary to address the
power or willingness of the government to provide protection to the
applicant. To obtain protection as a refugee, the applicant was required
to establish that the harm she feared was from the government or from
someone whom the government was unwilling or unable to control.
The Board noted that the government refused to grant protection to the
applicant.
The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada reaffirmed gender-
related social group classifications in later cases involving Lebanese
Moslem women, 1 75 and Sri Lankan Tamil women.
17 6
The Immigration Appeals Tribunal of the United Kingdom and the
Refugee Status Appeals Authority of New Zealand have also recognized
the social group category of women who face persecution for violating
social or religious mores. 17 7 Additionally, a number of countries have
174. Id. at 3.
175. See Immigration and Refugee Board, Decision T89-00260, July 1989 (Can.)
(endorsing the "particular social group" theory presented in Incirdyan, but finding
that the claimant had not established that the harm she faced was a result of her
membership in a particular social group).
176. See Immigration and Refugee Board, Decisions T89-00587, T-89-0058, T89-
0089,June 1989 (Can.) (finding the applicant had a well founded fear of persecution
on account of her perceived political opinion and her membership in the particular
social group of "young Tamil women." The applicant and her family had been sub-
jected to sustained persecution by the Sri Lankan military and the Indian Peace-
Keeping Force. On one occasion, she had been taken from her home and stripped by
soldiers. Her aunt had been raped and killed by the Indian Peace-Keeping Forces.
The Board did not discuss the requirements for establishing eligibility through mem-
bership in a particular group but noted in its decision the particular vulnerability of
young Tamil women in Sri Lanka.); see also Immigration and Refugee Board, Decision
M89-01213, June 1989 (Can.) (finding, with no analysis of the social group standard,
applicant was part of the group of young Tamil females and also part of a family
perceived to be opposed to the government of Sri Lanka).
177. See M.M.G. v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, Immigration
Appeal Tribunal, Case No. Th/9515/85 (5216), Feb. 25, 1987 (U.K.) (finding that
penalties imposed upon women for transgressing the mores of dress and behavior in
Iran can amount to persecution, but declining to grant protection to the applicant, in
large part because of doubt regarding whether the applicant would refuse to comply
with the rules once in Iran); Refugee Appeal No. 80/91 re: NS, (Refugee Status
Appeals Authority) Feb. 20, 1992 (N.Z.) (granting protection to a woman based on
membership in a particular social group consisting of Moslem women living separate
from their husbands in a Moslem community with no accommodation and no male
family or financial support available to them and with a reputation for having trans-
gressed the mores of their community).
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granted protection to Iranian women, based on their refusal to conform
to dress codes and other behavioral requirements established for
women. 17 8 Most recently, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee
Board' 79 has recognized the eligibility of women who fall into this cate-
gory through the issuance of guidelines specifically including this group
of women as a protected social group.180
Included in this category are women, such as the applicant in Incir-
ciyan, who, through circumstances over which they have no control, are
not able to comply with the expectations of their religion, culture or
society as well as women who make conscious ideological choices that
they cannot conform to the requirements of that religion, culture or
society. The particular social group will be identified by the characteris-
tic which puts them at odds with their society. An example of women
who fall into this category is the group of women who, because of deeply
held beliefs, cannot conform to fundamentalist Islamic codes enforced
in countries such as Iran or Saudi Arabia.' 8 ' A second example is
women who are perceived as no longer conforming to the strict moral
178. For the most part, these cases have been framed within or joined with a
"political opinion" theory. See Case No. AN 5 K 87.38024, Administrative Court at
Anbach, Dec. 14, 1989 (F.R.G.) (granting asylum under the Convention and Art.
16(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany to an Iranian woman
who lost her job as a kindergarten teacher because she had refused to apply the
Islamic dress code to her students, and because she knowingly hired a B'hai teacher);
Case No. 439-26428-86, (Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees),
Nov. 24, 1988 (F.R.G.) (granting asylum under the Convention and Art. 16(2) of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany to politically active Iranian woman
granted based on expression of political opinion and social group of "Iranian
women." The office held: "[T]he ideologically based power of men over women
results in a general political repression of women in defiance of their individual liber-
ties and human rights"; Case No. 60025 (Refugee Appeals Board), Dec. 19, 1989
(FRA) (granting asylum to an Iranian woman who was a Christian of Armenian
descent and who had refused to wear the chador). See also Matter of M. M., (A#
withheld).
179. The Immigration Refugee Board (IRB), created in 1989, is an administrative
tribunal with quasi-judicial functions conferred by statute. The function of the Refu-
gee Division of the IRB is to make determinations of refugee claims. Nurjehan
Mawani, Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: The
Canadian Experience, Address Before the United Nations Conference on Human
Rights (June 18, 1993) (transcript on file with the author).
180. The CANADIAN GUIDELINES include:
Women who fear persecution as the consequence for failing to conform to, or
for transgressing, certain gender-discriminating religious or customary laws
and practices in their country of origin. Such laws and practices, by singling
out women and placing them in a more vulnerable position than men, may
create conditions precedent to a gender-defined social group. The religious
precepts, social traditions or cultural norms which women may be accused of
violating can range from choosing their own spouses instead of accepting an
arranged marriage to such matters as the wearing of make-up, the visibility or
length of hair, or the type of clothing a women chooses to wear.
CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 3.
181. For example, in Iran a woman who fails to conform to the hejab, the require-
ment that women wear garments covering every part of their bodies but their faces




codes imposed upon them in their societies because they were raped or
sexually abused.18
2
To establish eligibility under a social group theory, a woman in this
situation must demonstrate that the characteristic by which the group is
identified is one which is fundamental to her identity. It may be a char-
acteristic which is beyond her ability to change, such as her status as a
widow, single mother or woman who has been raped or sexual abused;
or it may be a characteristic or belief which is so fundamental to her
identity that she should not be required to change, such as deeply held
and demonstrated feminist beliefs, or beliefs against particular practices
or laws of her society.' 83 The fundamental nature of her belief is a
question of fact, which the adjudicator must determine according to the
individual circumstances of the case.
In addition, the persecutor should be able to distinguish members
of the particular social group from the general population. If the perse-
cution is "on account of" the applicant's membership in the group, it
follows that the persecutor must be able to identify the applicant as a
member of the group. The distinguishing characteristic is the character-
istic by which the applicant is identified and which persecutor seeks to
punish. The perception of the persecutor is, therefore, a key element in
defining the group.
d. Women Who Face Severe Discrimination, Either By Law or By
Custom, Within Their Countries
In many countries, women are subjected to discriminatory treat-
ment either through law or through the imposition of cultural or reli-
gious norms which restrict the rights and opportunities of women.' 8 4 In
some situations, however, the discriminatory treatment can be so severe
that it rises to the level of persecution. Discrimination in and of itself
can amount to persecution when the discriminatory measures deprive
the woman of fundamental human rights or lead to consequences of a
substantially prejudicial nature. Such consequences include serious
restrictions on her right to earn her livelihood, her right to practice her
religion or her access to normally available educational facilities.' 85
Even when individual acts of discrimination are not of a substantially
serious character, and therefore do not, standing alone, amount to per-
secution, they may nevertheless form the basis for an asylum claim if the
cumulative effect leads to a seriously prejudicial situation for the appli-
cant or "if they produce, in the mind of the person concerned, a feeling
182. In addition to the actual sexual abuse, women in many countries are often
rejected or harmed by their families or communities as a result of the abuse. See
WOMEN ON THE FRONT LINE, supra note 26, at 18; see also Makiya, supra note 28, at 627.
183. For example, genital surgery or the veiling of women.
184. See generally UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME TEAM, HUMAN DEVEL-
OPMENT REPORT 1993 (1993).
185. UNHGR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 54; see also CANADIAN GUIDELINES,
supra note 36, at 3.
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of apprehension and insecurity as regards (her) future existence." 18 6
Neither the Board of Immigration Appeals nor the United States
judicial system has addressed the question of whether gender-related
discrimination can constitute persecution under the Act. However, the
UNHCR has recognized that severe discrimination against women based
on gender can form the basis for a claim to refugee status. 18 7 While
acknowledging the universal right of women to be free from discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender, the UNHCR has noted that the line between
discrimination and persecution is not a clear one. 188 In evaluating a
claim based on discriminatory treatment, the adjudicator must evaluate
all of the circumstances, 1 8 9 including the type of right or freedom
denied, 190 the manner in which the right is denied, the seriousness of
the harm to the applicant, and any non-persecutory justification for the
discriminatory treatment. 19 1 Fundamental human rights, such as the
right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life or the right to be free
from torture can never be abrogated. 192 Therefore, any policy or prac-
tice which allows for the violation of such a right based on membership
186. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 55; see also INS MANUAL, supra note
46, at 24.
187. See Note on Refugee Women and International Protection, at 5, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/
59 (1990); see also UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 40, para. 71 (recommending
promotion of acceptance in the asylum adjudication process of the principle that
"women fearing persecution or severe discrimination on the basis of their gender
should be considered a member of a social group for the purposes of determining
refugee status").
188. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, para. 55:
Women may also flee their country because of severe sexual discrimination
either by official bodies or in local communities. Protection from sexual dis-
crimination is a basic right of all women and is enshrined in a number of
international declarations and conventions. While the universal right to free-
dom from discrimination on grounds of sex is recognized, and discrimination
can constitute persecution under certain circumstances, the dividing line
between discrimination and persecution is not a clear one.
189. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 55.
190. Rights can be divided into four categories: 1) basic non-derogable rights
such as the right to be protected against arbitrary deprivation of life, from slavery,
and from torture and cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment; 2) basic derogable
rights such as the right to equal protection and freedom from arbitrary arrest and
detention, which may be abrogated only during times of public emergency; 3) realiza-
ble or obtainable rights, such as the right to employment and housing; and 4) rights
which may be beyond the states's duty to protect. See HATHAWAY, supra note 46, at
108-12; see also Immigration and Refugee Board Decision T92-06668, Feb. 1993
(Can.) at 10. All of these rights are derived from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. In addition, the enforcement of first and second level rights was made bind-
ing on states parties through their incorporation into the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976). See HATHAWAY, supra note 46, at
108-10. Incorporation of Third Level Rights into the International Convention on
Economic, Social and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976), created a duty on member
states to work toward progressive realization of those rights in a non-discriminatory
manner. See HATHAWAY, supra note 46, at 110-11.
191. SeeJames Hathaway, Framework of Analysis, Special Issue I, 12-13 (Sept. 1992).
192. See supra note 190.
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in a particular social group must be considered persecution. 193 A harm
to a lesser right may be persecutory if the harm is systematic or cumula-
tive and "seriously affect(s) the integrity and human dignity of the
applicant."1
9 4
Cases arising within this category are similar to those falling within
the previous category, "women who face persecution for transgressing
social or religious mores." However, in this situation, the persecution is
not the punishment that the woman endures for having violated the
norm, but rather the imposition of the law or norm in and of itself.
When the discriminatory practice is applied specifically to women as
women, the treatment is "on account of" membership in the particular
social group of women of the applicant's nationality. When the practice
is applied to only a certain group of women, the particular social group
is defined by those characteristics which distinguish that group of
women from the general population.
The applicant must also establish that the government is the source
of the persecutory measures or that the government is unable or unwill-
ing to protect her from the persecution. When the treatment is through
discriminatory statutes enforced by the government, government
involvement is clear. When the discriminatory practice is not applied by
the government, but through cultural norms which discriminate against
women, the applicant must demonstrate both the existence of the norm
and the failure or inability of the government to protect her from its
imposition. 19 5 This is a factual question which the adjudicator must
determine on a case-by-case basis. The adjudicator should give consid-
eration to relevant human rights instruments including the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 19
6
193. See Hathaway, supra note 191, at 12. See also, e.g., Immigration and Refugee
Board (Refugee Divison), Decision U92-06668, Feb. 1993 (Can.) at 12 (finding that a
pattern of physical abuse, rape and killings of Zimbabwean women by males consti-
tutes serious discrimination at the hands of Zimbabwean male society, and thus,
persecution).
194. Hathaway, supra note 191, at 13. See, e.g., Cheung v. Minister of Employment
and Immigration, 102 D.L.R.4th 214 (1993) (finding that a second child in China
facing severe discrimination for her membership in the particular social group of
"second children," including deprivation of medical care, education, employment
opportunities and food had a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of
the Convention).
195. See, e.g., Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision U92-
06668, Feb. 19, 1993 (Can.) at 12 (finding, in addition to the persecution of the
claimant at the hands of her husband, that the authorities were "not yet able to pro-
vide adequate safeguards to control the situation; and that the government [was] not
above monitoring reports of human rights abuses from private citizens, or soliciting
the support of the state agencies to repress activities of human rights
organizations").
196. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 194, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/34/46 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW]. Article 1 of CEDAW defines discrimina-
tion as
[a]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality
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which defines the duties of states to eliminate discriminatory treatment
of women19 7 and provides meaningful guidelines for evaluating the
state's failure or inability to protect women. Consideration should also
be given to the circumstances faced by the individual applicant, includ-
ing her efforts to seek protection from the discriminatory treatment, and
to documentation of conditions within the particular country. 198
e. Women who face persecution because of their relationships to
family members whom the persecutor seeks to harm
Women also face persecution because of their relationships to family
members.19 9 This can be the case when the government or other perse-
cutor seeks to obtain information concerning relatives who are per-
ceived to hold views or to be engaged in activities in opposition to the
persecutor 20 0 or when the persecutory seeks to intimidate or punish
politically active family members to discourage further involvement in
political activity.2 0 1 This type of persecution is closely related to and
will often overlap with persecution based on imputed political opinion.
The persecution the applicant fears is not based on any opinion she
of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the polit-
ical, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
The United States has not yet ratified CEDAW, and a number of ratifying countries
have made substantive reservations. See RebeccaJ. Cook, Reservations to the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 643,
644 (1990).
In addition to CEDAW, the UNHCR has recognized the importance of a number of
other instruments in providing a framework for international standards for the treat-
ment of women, including: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 1949
Geneva Convention and two Additional Protocols of 1977; the 1966 Human Rights
Covenants; the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency
and Armed Conflict; the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Mar-
riage and Registration of Marriages; the Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. UNHCR Guidelines, supra
note 17, at 8.
Although individual states are not parties to many of the instruments, their useful-
ness in defining norms should be recognized. Id.
197. See CEDAW, supra note 196, pt. 1, art. 1.
198. See, e.g., Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision U92-
06668, Feb. 19, 1993 (Can.) at 11 (examining documentation indicating that,
although legal prohibitions against discriminatory practices exist in Zimbabwe,
women remain "vulnerable to entrenched discriminatory practices that operate
against their personal rights."). One possible source of such documentation is the
collection of periodic reports filed by states parties to CEDAW regarding their pro-
gress in implementing the provisions of CEDAW. See CEDAW, supra note 196, art.
21. Other sources are the reports of human rights organizations. See, e.g., WOMEN'S
RIGHTS PROJECT & AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIMINAL INJUSTICE:
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN BRAZIL, supra note 28.
199. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 36-37, para. 56 ("[w]omen victimized
because of the political activities of a male relative have particular difficulty demon-
strating their claim to refugee status. Yet, in many conflicts, attacks on women rela-
tives are a planned part of a terror campaign.").
200. See Johnsson, supra note 3, at 223; AMNESTY INT'L, WOMEN ON THE FRONT
LINE, supra note 26, at 13-15.
201. See AMNESTY INT'L, WOMEN ON THE FRONT LINE, supra note 26, at 27-28.
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actually holds. Rather, her feared harm is the result of her relationship
to someone else, whether because the opinion of the family member is
imputed to her, because the persecutor seeks to obtain information con-
cerning the family member, or because the persecutor seeks to punish
the family member by harming the applicant. While neither the Board
of Immigration Appeals nor United States courts have yet recognized as
a particular social group "women who are family members of individuals
a persecutor seeks to harm," a number of courts and administrative bod-
ies have recognized that families can constitute particular social
groups. 20 2 Additionally, the principle of imputed political opinion is
widely recognized.
20 3
To establish eligibility for asylum under this category, the applicant
must establish a family relationship with someone the government or
other persecutor seeks to harm. She must demonstrate either that her
particular family constitutes a particular social group 20 4 within the
meaning of the refugee definition or that "women who are family mem-
bers of individuals the government or other persecutor seeks to harm"
in her country constitute a particular social group. She must further
prove that her fear of persecution on that basis is well-founded.
The applicant's family membership is an immutable characteristic,
as it is beyond her ability to change.205 In addition, the applicant must
demonstrate that the government seeks to harm her particular family
member and that she is identifiable as a family member of that individ-
ual. These are all questions of fact which the adjudicator must deter-
mine according to the individual circumstances of each case.
20 6
202. See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing
immediate family members as the prototypical example of a particular social group);
Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 623 (1st Cir. 1985) (granting asylum to
applicant who raised particular social group claim based on membership in a family
associated with the former government, the Ashanti tribe, and the educated profes-
sional class). Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985) (citing kinship
ties as one of a number of examples of immutable characteristics which may define a
particular social group); see also Case no. 16A 10001/88 (Higher Administrative
Court), Nordrhein-Westfalen, May 3, 1988 (F.R.G.) (granting protection under Art.
16(II)(2) of the Constitution to Iranian citizen based on persecution of kin); see also
CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 3 (recognizing "persecution of kin" involving
"violence or harassment against women, who are not themselves accused of any
antagonistic views or political convictions, in order to pressure them into revealing
information about the whereabouts or the political activities of their family mem-
bers"). But see Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1991).
203. See Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988); Lazo-Majano v. I.N.S., 813
F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987); Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th
Cir. 1985). See also Rees, supra note 47.
204. The family relationship will generally be limited to members of an immediate
family. See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. However, depending on the cul-
tural and political context of the applicant's country, members of an extended family
may qualify as a particular social group.
205. See supra part III.B.1.
206. For example, members of an immediate family will usually be identifiable as
such, while members of an extended family who may have little contact with each
other or live in different areas and may not share a family name may not be identifi-
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Once the existence of a particular social group has been estab-
lished, the applicant must prove that she has been persecuted in the past
or that she has a well-founded fear that she will be persecuted in the
future based on her group membership. She can do this by presenting
facts specific to her case which demonstrate that her particular fear is
well-founded, 20 7 or by establishing that in her country, the government
or other persecutors engage in a pattern or practice of persecuting fam-
ily members of persons they seek to harm.
20 8
f. Women who face battering or other abuse by non-governmental
actors and who are unable to obtain the protection of their
government
There is no published United States decision which addresses the ques-
tion of whether women who face battering or other abuse by non-gov-
ernmental actors can obtain protection under the Act;20 9 nor does the
UNHCR Handbook specifically address this issue. The Canadian Immi-
gration and Refugee Board (IRB), however, has recently recognized that
the particular social group category of the Convention refugee defini-
tion protects women subject to domestic abuse who cannot obtain the
protection of their governments.2 10 In February 1993, in a landmark
able as a family. Compare Aneneh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985)
with Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1991).
207. For example, when the claim is based on membership in the applicant's par-
ticular family, she may be able to show that she or other close family members may
have been persecuted or threatened with persecution based on their family
membership.
208. See 8 CFR 208.13(b)(2)(A).
209. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[Wie do not suggest
that women who have been repeatedly and systematically brutalized by particular
attackers cannot assert a well-founded fear of persecution"). But see Alcantara v. INS,
No. 92-70286 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1993); 1993 WL 43869 (unpublished decision
upholding denial of political asylum and withholding of deportation to citizen of the
Philippines based on abuse extending over a period of nineteen years by her hus-
band, who was connected to the National People's Army, finding that she had failed
to demonstrate the harm she feared was motivated by other than personal reasons).
Cases are currently pending before the EOIR and the BIA where this issue has been
raised. See Matter of A.R.A., (A# withheld); Matter of E.B., (A# withheld). See also
Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 91.
210. See Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision No. U92-
06668, Feb. 19, 1993 (Can.); see also Minister of Employment & Immigration v. Mar-
cel Mayers, 97 D.L.R.4th 729 (1992) (finding that "Trinidadian women subject to
wife abuse" could constitute a particular social group within the Convention refugee
definition). See also CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 7.
In some cases the claims of battered women have also been formulated under a
political opinion or imputed political opinion theory. This is particularly appropriate
when the batterer has a connection to the government and uses or threatens to use
that connection to harm the victim. See, e.g., Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th
Cir. 1987); see also Matter of N.P-F., A71-796-050 (case pending before immigration
judge in which battered woman raised asylum claims based on membership in a gen-
der-based particular social group. The INS conceded that the respondent was eligi-
ble for political asylum based on an imputed political opinion because her spouse
accused her of subversive beliefs and activities and reported her to the government).
In addition, some have argued that, by refusing to submit to domination by the bat-
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decision, the Immigration and Refugee Board granted protection to a
woman from Zimbabwe who sought refugee status based on a history of
abuse by her husband and her inability to obtain protection against that
abuse from the government of Zimbabwe. The claimant, a Christian,
had been forced into a traditional polygamous marriage at the age of
fourteen to a man many years her senior.2 11 Throughout the marriage,
the claimant's husband, a wealthy businessman affiliated with the gov-
ernment, subjected his wife to repeated abuse, including beatings and
rapes. The claimant unsuccessfully sought protection from both her
parents and the police. The Immigration and Refugee Board first evalu-
ated the extent of the harm to which the applicant was subjected in light
of relevant human rights instruments2 12 and found that the harm rose to
the level of persecution as defined in the UNHCR Handbook.21 3 The
Board then found that the claimant qualified as a member of two partic-
ular social groups within the Convention refugee definition: 2 14 unpro-
tected Zimbabwean women or girls subject to wife abuse, and
Zimbabwean women or girls forced to marry according to customary
laws of "Kuzvararia" and "Lobola."2 15 The defining characteristic of
the first group was found to be gender: "In considering the first group,
the panel identifies the innate and unalterable characteristic which
defines this group as that of their gender which the group cannot repu-
diate and which the evidence presented at this hearing suggests, places
them at risk in Zimbabwe."
21 6
The evidence presented included the claimant's own testimony and
substantial documentary evidence of extensive domestic abuse in
terer, the victim expresses a political opinion regarding the relationship between
men and women and that the victim is punished by the batterer for expressing that
opinion. See Goldberg, supra note 154. This view is supported by the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
211. The marriage was conducted according to customary laws of "Kuzvarira" and
"Lobola." The IRB defined "Kuzvarira" as "the giving of young girls for marriage
without their permission" and defined "Lubola" as "the custom of giving 'bride
money' for the purchase of a bride to the parents of the would-be wife." Immigra-
tion and Refugee Board (Refugee Division) Decision No. U92-06668 at 11 (Can.).
212. Specifically, the IRB found that the treatment to which she was subjected was
in violation of Articles 3, 5 and 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
Articles 7, 9, and 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id.
at 7-9.
213. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 51.
214. In defining the groups, the IRB incorporated the persecution into the articu-
lation of the social group.
215. In addition to finding that the claimant's persecution was on account of her
membership in these particular social groups, the IRB found that her forced mar-
riage under non-Christian rights constituted persecution on account of her Christian
religion. See Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division) Decision No. U92-
06668 at 14.
216. Id. at 16. There is an apparent inconsistency in the position of the Immigra-
tion and Refugee Board. While stating that the defining characteristic is simply gen-
der, the actual social group is defined in terms of the persecution. See also Cheung v.
M.E.I., 102 D.L.R.4th 214 (1993). For a discussion of this issue, see supra part
III.B.2.b.; see also Stairs & Pope, supra note 89, at 171.
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Zimbabwe and the failure of the state to protect women from such
abuse. Based on this evidence, the IRB found that
women, particularly those from rural areas, generally experience serious
discrimination at the hands of Zimbabwean male society; that physical
abuse, rape and killings are an integral part of their abuse; that the
authorities are not yet able to provide adequate safeguards to control the
situation; and that the government is not above monitoring the support of
the state agencies to repress activities of human rights organizations.
2 17
In a similar case decided in June 1993, the IRB granted protection
to a woman from Ecuador who fled her country seeking protection from
an abusive spouse. 2 18 The claimant in that case had been beaten and
raped repeatedly over a ten-year period.2 19 She unsuccessfully sought
police protection. On one occasion, the police "laughed at her and said
she must have done something wrong to be beaten." 220 The claimant
obtained a divorce from her husband but continued to receive threats
from him. After her divorce, she was assaulted by him on the street.
Her brother reported the assault to the police, but the police took no
action. The claimant fled Ecuador and entered Canada on a false pass-
port. In support of her refugee claim, she testified that domestic vio-
lence is prevalent in Ecuador and gave personal examples of such abuse
among her family and friends. In addition to her testimony, the IRB
considered documentary evidence of a pervasive pattern of domestic
violence in Ecuador, and the fact that a woman cannot obtain protection
from domestic abuse in Ecuador.2 2 1 In evaluating the persecutory
nature of the harm suffered by the claimant, the IRB stated:
There is a vast difference between a matrimonial home and a torture
chamber. If a wife is subjected to violence repeatedly, then in our assess-
ment, she stands in no different situation than a person who has been
arrested, detained and beaten on a number of occasions because of his
political opinion. As a matter of fact, such a person suffers to a lesser
degree over a period of time, because after each detention he is released
and enjoys his freedom. The wife on the other hand has no respite from
her agony of torture and grief. She must endure these misfortunes
continuously.
2 22
The IRB found that "Ecuadoran women subject to wife abuse" con-
stitute a particular social group within the convention "refugee" defini-
217. Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision No. U92-06668
at 12 (Can.).
218. Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision No. U92-
08714,June 4, 1993 (Can.).
219. As a result of one beating, she suffered a miscarriage.
220. Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision No. U92-
08714, at 2-3 (Can.).
221. The IRB noted that "violence against wives in Ecuador is a normative phe-
nomenon which is the outcome of the patriarchal structure of society." Id. at 4.
Domestic violence is not a crime in Ecuador and the law prevents married women
from testifying against their husbands. Id. at 5.
222. Id. at 7.
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tion and that, because of the severity of the harm, the abuse of the
claimant, and the unwillingness of the state to provide protection consti-
tuted persecution.
Applying the principles set forth in these cases, a woman seeking
protection from severe abuse can obtain protection within a particular
social group category if she can establish that the abuse to which she was
subjected was a result of her gender and that she was unable to obtain
protection against the abuse from her government. The applicant must
establish that she has a fear of persecution, that the fear is well-founded,
that the fear is on account of her membership in a particular social
group, and that the government is unable or unwilling to protect her
from the persecution. First, she must establish that the treatment that
she fears rises to the level of persecution. The adjudicator should deter-
mine this issue on a case-by-case basis, evaluating the individual circum-
stances in light of the case law, Handbook definition, relevant human
rights instruments 223 and available documentation relating specifically
to the effects of prolonged battering and other domestic abuse.
22 4
Next, the applicant must demonstrate that the persecution is on
account of her membership in a particular social group. Unless the evi-
dence establishes that only particular groups of women are singled out
for extensive abuse or that protection is denied only to certain groups of
women, the particular social group will often be simply "women" 22 5 of
the applicant's nationality. 2 26 Other elements of the refugee definition
limit the ultimate size of the group eligible for protection. For example,
while the social group may be defined as all women, to establish eligibil-
223. See supra parts III.A., III.B.2.d.
224. The treatment of women subjected to severe battering over an extended
period of time has been compared to that of torture victims. See Stairs & Pope, supra
note 89, at 176 (comparing the treatment of battered women to the treatment of
torture victims through use of Biderman's Chart of Coercion); see also DIANA E. H.
RUSSEL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (rev. ed. 1990) (comparing information from Amnesty
Int'l, Report on Torture regarding methods of brainwashing of prisoners to treatment
of women in abusive relationships);JUDITH L. HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE
AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE-FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR (1992).
225. This analysis is sightly different from that applied by the Immigration and
Refugee Board in the Zimbabwean case, as the definition of the group is determined
solely by gender. Applying the analysis recently adopted by the IRB and the Cana-
dian Appeals Court, the group could be defined as "battered women" or "women
subject to battering by their spouses or other non-governmental actors." A defini-
tion of a social group which relies on the persecution is not consistent with domestic
jurisprudence, however. See supra part III.B.2.b. In addition, the IRB has recognized
that gender alone can be the defining characteristic of a particular social group. See
CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 5. In an attempt to limit the size of the par-
ticular social group, some advocates have formulated the group by linking the abuse
to the victim's refusal to submit to the domination of the persecutor. See, e.g.,
Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 91 (discussing pending case in which particular social
group was articulated as "women whose refusal to submit to the domination of a
legal or common-union husband has resulted in repeated life-threatening assaults
despite efforts to obtain protection from state authorities").
226. Because the vulnerability of the applicant is always defined in relation to the
country to which she seeks to avoid return, the group will virtually always also be
defined by the applicant's nationality or country of last habitual residence.
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ity for protection, the applicant will also be required to establish that the
group is subject to that persecution, that she has a well-founded fear of
that persecution, and that the feared persecution is from the govern-
ment or from someone whom the government is unable or unwilling to
control. Not all women will meet this standard; and not all women who
have been battered in the past will meet the standard. Ordinarily, the
applicant must establish a well-founded fear that she will be battered in
the future, based on severe battering in the past or on some other condi-
tion that indicates that her fear of future battering is well-founded.
2 27
In addition, she must establish that the government is unwilling or
unable to protect her, either by demonstrating that she sought, unsuc-
cessfully, to obtain protection in the past, or that conditions in her coun-
try are such that it would be futile for her to seek protection from the
government. The applicant can demonstrate this through expert testi-
mony or through the presentation of documentary evidence, if available,
regarding the incidence of violence against women and domestic abuse
in her country and the response of the authorities to such abuse.
Three major problems arise in the context of presenting an asylum
claim based on domestic abuse. First, presenting a claim on this basis
requires an examination of the home and family-an area which the gov-
ernment has traditionally considered the most private and subject to the
least regulation. The court may, therefore, easily characterize the prob-
lem as a mere personal dispute unless the applicant can demonstrate a
consistent pattern on the part of the government of inability or refusal
to protect women from such abuse.2 28 Second, the challenge of
addressing domestic abuse in the United States may cause adjudicators
to feel reluctant to pass judgment on another country's failure to pro-
vide adequate protection to its female citizens. Third, there is little doc-
umentary evidence concerning the particular treatment of women in this
area. In many countries, statistics regarding reports of domestic abuse
are not available. 22 9 Additionally, when maintained, statistics are gener-
ally not an accurate reflection of the extent problems in this area
because women are often reluctant to report such crimes. 23 0 However,
there is a growing recognition that, in many cases, governments system-
atically refuse to protect women subject to repeated and severe abuse
and that it is women's particular vulnerability within certain societies
that allows them, as women, to be subjected to this abuse with no
227. In some cases in which the applicant was subjected to extreme battering in
the past, she may be able to establish eligibility for political asylum based on past
persecution alone. See supra note 45.
228. See for example, Matter of A.R.A, supra note 38 (in which the Bureau of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs of the U.S. State Department wrote an opin-
ion letter suggesting that the domestic abuse which was the basis of the applicant's
asylum claim may be a "personal security concern.").
229. See, e.g., WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT AND AMERICAS WATCH, CRIMINAL INJUS-





IV. Improved Procedures for Adjudicating Women's Cases
The evaluation of gender-related persecution claims also requires a
rethinking of the procedures followed by advocates and adjudicators in
developing and presenting the cases of refugee women. The United
States asylum adjudication system contains no provisions which
acknowledge the particular needs of women asylum applicants. 23 2 As a
result, numerous problems inherent in the system, which go unad-
dressed, combine to deny women access to protection.23 3 The UNHCR
has recommended a number of measures to improve access to protec-
tion for women.2 3 4 These measures include: providing women access
to independent adjudication of their cases; instituting gender-sensitive
procedures for interviewing women applicants; 23 5 providing specific
training regarding interviewing women who have been sexually
abused;23 6 providing women with the opportunity to be interviewed
without the presence of family members;23 7 providing training regard-
ing the nature of relationships between female and male family mem-
bers within the applicant's culture;2 3 8 and familiarizing adjudicators
with status and experiences of women in the country from which the
applicant has fled.23 9 While these guidelines do not address all of the
problems faced by women asylum applicants, incorporation of these rec-
231. See id., (one of the first comprehensive country conditions evaluations to
address domestic violence as a violation of international human rights. The report
found serious inadequacies in the legal standards applied in cases of wife-murder,
battery of women and rape, discriminatory practices in investigating and prosecuting
cases of violence against women, and a social context in which women are discour-
aged from seeking protection. The report noted that because of this combination of
factors, perpetrators of domestic violence are allowed to act with virtual impunity,
and criticized the government of Brazil for failing to meet its international obliga-
tions under the International Covenant on civil and Political Rights and the Conven-
tion to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Unfortunately this
kind of comprehensive documentation is the exception.).
232. This is true for proceedings before the Asylum Unit of the INS as well as
those before the Immigration Court of the Executive Office for Immigration Review.
233. See Introduction, supra, for a discussion regarding procedural problems.
234. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, at 26-28, paras. 71-76. These guidelines
have been cited with approval within the Canadian Guidelines. See CANADIAN GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 36, at 9.
235. These procedures include employing women as interpreters and interviewers
whenever possible, UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 17, para. 72, and providing training
regarding interviewing and assessment of claims of women applicants. Id.
236. Id., paras. 72, 75.
237. The presence of family members often inhibits a woman's ability to discuss
traumatic events, particularly sexual abuse. Id., para. 72.
238. The purpose of this training is to avoid misinterpretation of information pro-
vided within an interview or hearing. For example, in societies where women are
unlikely to be aware of the specific activities of male family members, inability to
corroborate information provided by male family members should not be interpreted
as a lack of credibility. Id.
239. This training should include information regarding the political, economic
and social rights of women, reported incidents of gender-specific violence, protection
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ommendations into domestic asylum adjudication procedures would
greatly help in opening the process to women applicants.
Conclusion
While the refugee definition incorporated into the Convention and the
INA is gender-neutral, the law has developed within a male paradigm
which reflects the factual circumstances of male applicants, but which
does not respond to the particular protection needs of women. A multi-
faceted approach 240 presents the most effective means of addressing the
claims of women asylum applicants. This approach includes a recogni-
tion of both gender-specific persecution and gender-based persecution,
which can, for the most part, be incorporated into particular social
group category of the existing Convention refugee definition.
Fundamentally, it includes a legal recognition of the harm women
experience and the illegitimacy of governmental indifference to
women's suffering. In addition, advocates and adjudicators must re-
evaluate the manner in which the claims of women are investigated and
presented to insure that these claims become a more accurate reflection
of women's reality. This includes the institution of procedures to insure
that women have a meaningful opportunity to present their cases and
education of advocates and adjudicators regarding the nature of perse-
cution of women, both with regard to the overall political and social
framework in which it occurs and in relation to the specific factual situa-
tions of particular countries.
available to women and the "consequences that may befall a woman on her return in
light of the circumstances described in her claim." Id.
240. See generally Greatbatch, supra note 2.
